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Abstract
Like any other logical theory, domain descriptions in reasoning
about actions may evolve, and thus need revision methods to ade-
quately accommodate new information about the behavior of actions.
The present work is about changing action domain descriptions in
propositional dynamic logic. Its contribution is threefold: first we
revisit the semantics of action theory contraction that has been done
in previous work, giving more robust operators that express minimal
change based on a notion of distance between Kripke-models. Second
we give algorithms for syntactical action theory contraction and estab-
lish their correctness w.r.t. our semantics. Finally we state postulates
for action theory contraction and assess the behavior of our operators
w.r.t. them. Moreover, we also address the revision counterpart of
action theory change, showing that it benefits from our semantics for
contraction.
1
Contents
1 Introduction 4
2 Logical Preliminaries 6
2.1 Action Theories in Dynamic Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 Essential Atoms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3 Prime Valuations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4 Closeness between Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3 Semantics of Action Theory Change 13
3.1 Model Contraction of Executability Laws . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.2 Model Contraction of Effect Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.3 Model Contraction of Static Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4 Syntactic Operators for Contraction of Laws 21
4.1 Contracting Executability Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.2 Contracting Effect Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.3 Contracting Static Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5 Correctness of the Operators 28
5.1 Two Counter-Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.2 Modular Theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.3 Correctness Under Modularity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6 Assessment of Postulates for Change 32
6.1 Contraction or Erasure? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
6.2 The Postulates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7 A Semantics for Action Theory Revision 37
7.1 Revising a Model by a Static Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
7.2 Revising a Model by an Effect Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
7.3 Revising a Model by an Executability Law . . . . . . . . . . . 41
7.4 Revising Sets of Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
8 Related Work 43
9 Comments 46
9.1 Other Distance Notions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
9.2 Inducing Executability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
10 Concluding Remarks 49
A Proof of Theorem 5.2 56
B Proof of Theorem 5.3 61
3
1 Introduction
Consider an intelligent agent designed to perform rationally in a dynamic
world, and suppose she should reason about the dynamics of an automatic
coffee machine (Figure 1). Suppose, for example, that the agent believes
that coffee is always a hot beverage. Suppose now that some day she gets
a coffee and observes that it is cold. In such a case, the agent must change
her beliefs about the relation between the propositions “I hold a coffee” and
“I hold a hot beverage”. This example is an instance of the problem of
changing propositional belief bases and is largely addressed in the literature
about belief change [15] and belief update [31].
Figure 1: The coffee deliverer agent.
Next, let our agent believe that whenever she buys a coffee from the
machine, she gets a hot beverage. This means that in every state of the
world that follows the execution of buying a coffee, the agent possesses a
hot beverage. Then, in a situation where the machine is running out of cups,
after buying, the coffee runs through the shelf and the agent does not hold
a hot beverage in her hands.
Imagine now that the agent never considered any relation between buying
a coffee on the machine and its service availability, in the sense that the
agent always believed that buying does not prevent other users from using
the machine. Nevertheless, someday our agent is queuing to buy a coffee
and observes that just after the agent before her has bought, the machine
went out of order (maybe due to a lack of coffee powder).
Completing our agent’s struggle in discovering the intricacies of a coffee
machine, suppose she always believed that if she has a token, then it is
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possible to buy coffee, provided that some other conditions like being close
enough to the button, having a free hand, etc, are satisfied. However, during
a blackout, the agent, even with a token, does not manage to buy her coffee.
The last three examples illustrate situations where changing the beliefs
about the behavior of the action of buying coffee is mandatory. In the first
one, buying coffee, once believed to be deterministic, has now to be seen
as nondeterministic, or alternatively to have a different outcome in a more
specific context (e.g. if there is no cup in the machine). In the second
example, buying a coffee is now known to have side-effects (ramifications)
one was not aware of. Finally, in the last example, the executability of the
action under concern is questioned in the light of new information showing
a context that was not known to preclude its execution.
Such cases of theory change are very important when one deals with
logical descriptions of dynamic domains: it may always happen that one
discovers that an action actually has a behavior that is different from that
one has always believed it had.
Up to now, theory change has been studied mainly for knowledge bases
in classical logics, both in terms of revision and update. Since the work by
Fuhrmann [14], only in a few recent studies has it been considered in the
realm of modal logics, viz. in epistemic logic [19] and in dynamic logics [21].
Recently some studies have investigated revision of beliefs about facts of the
world [47, 28] or the agent’s goals [46]. In our scenario, this would concern
for instance the truth of token in a given state: the agent believes that she
has a token, but is actually wrong about that. Then she might subsequently
be forced to revise her beliefs about the current state of affairs or change
her goals according to what she can perform in that state. Such belief
revision operations do not modify the agent’s beliefs about the action laws.
In opposition to that, here we are interested exactly in such modifications.
Starting with Baral and Lobo’s work [4], some recent studies have been done
on that issue [12, 13] for domain descriptions in action languages [16].
We here take a step further in this direction and propose a method based
on that given by Herzig et al. [21] that is more robust by integrating a notion
of minimal change and complying with postulates of theory change.
The present text is structured as follows: in Section 2 we establish the
formal background that will be used throughout this work. Sections 3–5
are the core of the work: in Section 3 we present the central definitions for
a semantics of action theory change, Section 4 is devoted to its syntactical
counterpart while Section 5 to the proof of its correspondence with the se-
mantics. In Section 6 we discuss some postulates for contraction/erasure and
5
then present a semantics for action theory revision (Section 7). In Section 8
we address existing work in the field. After making some comments on our
method (Section 9), we finish with some conclusions and future directions
of research.
2 Logical Preliminaries
Following the tradition in the reasoning about actions (RAA) community,
we consider action theories to be finite collections of statements that have
the particular form:
• if context, then effect after every execution of action (effect laws);
• if precondition, then action executable (executability laws).
Statements mentioning no action at all represent laws about the underlying
structure of the world, i.e., its possible states (static laws).
Several logical frameworks have been proposed to formalize such state-
ments. Among the most prominent ones are the Situation Calculus [39, 45],
the family of Action Languages [16, 30, 17], the Fluent Calculus [49, 50], and
the dynamic logic-based approaches [10, 6, 57]. Here we opt to formalize
action theories using a version of Propositional Dynamic Logic (PDL) [20].
2.1 Action Theories in Dynamic Logic
Let Act = {a1, a2, . . .} be the set of all atomic action constants of a given
domain. An example of atomic action is buy. To each atomic action a there
is associated a modal operator [a].1
Prop = {p1, p2, . . .} denotes the set of all propositional constants, also
called fluents or atoms. Examples of those are token (“the agent has a
token”) and coffee (“the agent holds a coffee”). The set of all literals is
Lit = {ℓ1, ℓ2, . . .}, where each ℓi is either p or ¬p, for some p ∈ Prop. If
ℓ = ¬p, then we identify ¬ℓ with p. By |ℓ| we denote the atom in ℓ.
We use small Greek letters ϕ,ψ, . . . to denote Boolean formulas. They
are recursively defined in the usual way:
ϕ ::= p | ⊤ | ⊥ | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ→ ϕ | ϕ↔ ϕ
1We here suppose that our multimodal logic is independently axiomatized [32], i.e.,
the logic is a fusion and there is no interaction between the modal operators. This is a
requirement to achieve modularity of action theories [25] (see further).
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Fml is the set of all Boolean formulas. An example of a Boolean formula is
coffee → hot. A propositional valuation v is a maximally consistent set of
literals. We denote by v  ϕ the fact that v satisfies a propositional formula
ϕ. By val(ϕ) we denote the set of all valuations satisfying ϕ. |=
CPL
denotes
the classical consequence relation. Cn(ϕ) denotes all logical consequences of
ϕ in classical propositional logic.
If ϕ is a propositional formula, atm(ϕ) denotes the set of elementary
atoms actually occurring in ϕ. For example, atm(¬p1∧(¬p1∨p2)) = {p1, p2}.
For ϕ a Boolean formula, IP(ϕ) denotes the set of its prime impli-
cants [43], i.e., the weakest terms (conjunctions of literals) that imply ϕ.
As an example, IP(p1 ⊕ p2) = {p1 ∧ ¬p2,¬p1 ∧ p2}. For more on prime
implicants, their properties and how to compute them see the chapter by
Marquis [36]. By π we denote a prime implicant, and given ℓ and π, ℓ ∈ π
abbreviates ‘ℓ is a literal of π’.
We denote complex formulas (possibly with modal operators) by Φ, Ψ, . . .
They are recursively defined in the following way:
Φ ::= ϕ | [a]Φ | ¬Φ | Φ ∧ Φ | Φ ∨ Φ | Φ→ Φ | Φ↔ Φ
〈a〉 is the dual operator of [a], defined as 〈a〉Φ =def ¬[a]¬Φ. An example of
a complex formula is ¬coffee→ [buy]coffee.
The semantics is that of PDL without the ∗ operator, which amounts
to multimodal logic Kn [42]. In the following we will refer to PDL but our
underlying logical formalism is essentially the simpler multimodal logic Kn,
which turns out to be expressive enough for our purposes here.
Definition 2.1 (PDL-model) A PDL-model is a tuple M = 〈W,R〉 where
W is a set of valuations (also called possible worlds), and R maps action
constants a to accessibility relations Ra ⊆W×W.
As an example, for Act = {a1, a2} and Prop = {p1, p2}, we have the
PDL-model M = 〈W,R〉, where
W = {{p1, p2}, {p1,¬p2}, {¬p1, p2}},
R(a1) =
{
({p1, p2}, {p1,¬p2}), ({p1, p2}, {¬p1, p2}),
({p1,¬p2}, {p1,¬p2}), ({p1,¬p2}, {¬p1, p2})
}
R(a2) = {({p1, p2}, {¬p1, p2}), ({¬p1, p2}, {¬p1, p2})}
Figure 2 gives a graphical representation of M .2
2Notice that our notion of PDL-model does not follow the standard notion from modal
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M :
p1, p2 p1,¬p2
¬p1, p2
a1
a1
a2
a1
a1
a2
Figure 2: Example of a PDL-model for Act = {a1, a2}, and Prop = {p1, p2}.
Definition 2.2 (Truth conditions) Given a PDL-model M = 〈W,R〉,
• |=
M
w
p (p is true at world w of model M ) if w  p (the valuation w
satisfies p, i.e., p ∈ w);
• |=
M
w
[a]Φ if |=
M
w′
Φ for every w′ s.t. (w,w′) ∈ Ra;
• |=
M
w
Φ ∧ Ψ if |=
M
w
Φ and |=
M
w
Ψ ;
• |=
M
w
Φ ∨ Ψ if |=
M
w
Φ or |=
M
w
Ψ , or both;
• |=
M
w
¬Φ if 6|=
M
w
Φ, i.e., not |=
M
w
Φ;
• truth conditions for the other connectives are as usual.
By M we will denote a set of PDL-models.
A PDL-model M is a model of Φ (denoted |=
M
Φ) if and only if for all
w ∈ W, |=
M
w
Φ. In the model depicted in Figure 2, we have |=
M
p1 → [a2]p2
and |=
M
p1 ∨ p2.
Definition 2.3 (Global consequence) M is a model of a set of formulas
Σ (noted |=
M
Σ) if and only if |=
M
Φ for every Φ ∈ Σ. A formula Φ is
a consequence of a set of global axioms Σ in the class of all PDL-models
(noted Σ |=
PDL
Φ) if and only if for every PDL-model M , if |=
M
Σ, then |=
M
Φ.
logics: here no two worlds satisfy the same valuation. This is a pragmatic choice (see Sec-
tion 4). Nevertheless, all we are about to state in the sequel can be straightforwardly
formulated for standard PDL models as well.
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With PDL we can state laws describing the behavior of actions. One way
of doing this is by stating some formulas as global axioms.3 As usually done
in the RAA community, we here distinguish three types of laws. The first
kind of statements are static laws, which are Boolean formulas that must
hold in every possible state of the world.
Definition 2.4 (Static Law) A static law is a formula ϕ ∈ Fml.
An example of a static law is coffee→ hot, saying that if the agent holds a
coffee, then she holds a hot beverage. The set of all static laws of a domain
is denoted by S ⊆ Fml. In our example we will have S = {coffee→ hot}.
The second kind of action law we consider is given by the effect laws.
These are formulas relating an action to its effects, which can be conditional.
Definition 2.5 (Effect Law) An effect law for action a is of the form ϕ→
[a]ψ, where ϕ,ψ ∈ Fml.
The consequent ψ is the effect which always obtains when action a is exe-
cuted in a state where the antecedent ϕ holds. If a is a nondeterministic
action, then the consequent ψ is typically a disjunction. An example of an
effect law is ¬coffee→ [buy]coffee, saying that in a situation where the agent
has no coffee, after buying, the agent has a coffee. If ψ is inconsistent, then
we have a special kind of effect law that we call an inexecutability law. For
example, we could also have ¬token → [buy]⊥, expressing that buy cannot
be executed if the agent has no token.
The set of effect laws of a domain is denoted by E . In our coffee machine
scenario, we could have for example:
E =
{
¬coffee→ [buy]coffee, token→ [buy]¬token,¬token→ [buy]⊥
}
Finally, we also define executability laws, which stipulate the context
where an action is guaranteed to be executable. In PDL, the operator 〈a〉 is
used to express executability. 〈a〉⊤ thus reads “the execution of a is possi-
ble”.
Definition 2.6 (Executability Law) An executability law for action a is
of the form ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤, where ϕ ∈ Fml.
3An alternative to that is given by Castilho et al. [6], with laws being stated with the
aid of an extra universal modality and local consequence being thus considered.
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For instance, token → 〈buy〉⊤ says that buying can be executed whenever
the agent has a token. The set of all executability laws of a given domain
is denoted by X . In our scenario example we would have X = {token →
〈buy〉⊤}.
With our three basic types of laws, we are able to define action theories:
Definition 2.7 (Action Theory) Given a domain and any (possibly empty)
sets of laws S , E , and X , T = S ∪ E ∪ X is an action theory.
For given action a, Ea (resp. Xa) will denote the set of only those effect
(resp. executability) laws about a. Ta = S ∪Ea∪Xa is then the action theory
for a.4
For the sake of clarity, we abstract here from the frame and ramifica-
tion problems, and suppose the agent’s theory already entails all the rele-
vant frame axioms. We could have used any suitable solution to the frame
problem, like e.g. the dependence relation [6], which is used in the work of
Herzig et al. [21], or a kind of successor state axioms in a slightly modified
setting [11]. To make the presentation more clear to the reader, here we do
not bother with a solution to the frame problem and just assume all frame
axioms can be inferred from the theory. Actually we can suppose that all
intended frame axioms are automatically recovered and stated in the the-
ory, more specific, in the set of effect laws.5 Hence the action theory of our
example will be:
T =


coffee→ hot, token→ 〈buy〉⊤,
¬coffee→ [buy]coffee,
token→ [buy]¬token,¬token→ [buy]⊥,
coffee→ [buy]coffee, hot→ [buy]hot


(We have not stated the frame axiom ¬token→ [buy]¬token because it can
be trivially deduced from the inexecutability law ¬token→ [buy]⊥.)
Figure 3 below shows a PDL-model for the theory T.
Given an action theory T, sometimes it will be useful to consider models
whose possible worlds are all the possible worlds allowed by T:
4Notice that for a1, a2 ∈ Act, a1 6= a2, the intuition is indeed that Ta1 and Ta2 overlap
only on S , i.e., the only laws that are common to both Ta1 and Ta2 are the laws about
the structure of the world. This requirement is somehow related with the logic being
independently axiomatized (see above).
5Frame axioms are a special type of effect law, having the form ℓ→ [a]ℓ, for ℓ ∈ Lit.
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M :
t, c, h
¬t, c, h
t,¬c, h
t,¬c,¬h
b b
b
Figure 3: A model for our coffee machine scenario: b, t, c, and h stand for,
respectively, buy, token, coffee, and hot.
Definition 2.8 (Big Model) Let T = S ∪ E ∪ X be an action theory.
Mbig = 〈Wbig,Rbig〉 is the big model of T if and only if:
• Wbig = val(S ); and
• Rbig =
⋃
a∈ActRa s.t. Ra = {(w,w
′) : for all ϕ → [a]ψ ∈ Ea, if |=
M
w
ϕ, then |=
M
w′
ψ}.
Figure 4 below shows the big model of T.
M :
t, c, h
¬t, c, h
t,¬c, h
¬t,¬c,¬h ¬t,¬c, ht,¬c,¬h
b b
b
Figure 4: The big model for the coffee machine scenario.
2.2 Essential Atoms
An atom p is essential to a formula ϕ if and only if p ∈ atm(ϕ′) for every ϕ′
such that |=
CPL
ϕ↔ ϕ′. For instance, p1 is essential to ¬p1∧(¬p1∨p2). Given
ϕ, atm!(ϕ) denotes the set of essential atoms of ϕ. (If ϕ is not contingent,
i.e., ϕ is a tautology or a contradiction, then atm!(ϕ) = ∅.)
11
Given ϕ a Boolean formula, ϕ∗ is the set of all formulas ϕ′ such that
ϕ |=
CPL
ϕ′ and atm(ϕ′) ⊆ atm!(ϕ). For instance, p1 ∨ p2 /∈ p1∗, as p1 |=CPL
p1 ∨ p2 but atm(p1 ∨ p2) 6⊆ atm!(p1). Clearly, atm(
∧
ϕ∗) = atm!(
∧
ϕ∗),
moreover whenever |=
CPL
ϕ ↔ ϕ′ is the case, then atm!(ϕ) = atm!(ϕ′) and
also ϕ∗ = ϕ′∗.
Theorem 2.1 (Least atom-set theorem [41]) Given ϕ a propositional
formula, |=
CPL
ϕ ↔
∧
ϕ∗, and for every ϕ′ s.t. |=
CPL
ϕ ↔ ϕ′, atm(ϕ∗) ⊆
atm(ϕ′).
A proof of this theorem is given by Makinson [35] and we do not state
it here. Essentially, the theorem establishes that for every formula ϕ, there
is a unique least set of elementary atoms such that ϕ may equivalently be
expressed using only letters from that set.6 Hence, Cn(ϕ) = Cn(ϕ∗).
2.3 Prime Valuations
Given a valuation v, v′ ⊆ v is a subvaluation. Given a set of valuations W, a
subvaluation v′ satisfies a propositional formula ϕ moduloW (noted v′ 
W
ϕ)
if and only if v  ϕ for all v ∈W such that v′ ⊆ v.
We say that a subvaluation v essentially satisfies ϕ (modulo W), noted
v 
!
W
ϕ, if and only if v 
W
ϕ and {|ℓ| : ℓ ∈ v} ⊆ atm!(ϕ). If v 
!
W
ϕ, we call v
an essential subvaluation of ϕ (modulo W).
Definition 2.9 (Prime Subvaluation) Let ϕ be a propositional formula
and W a set of valuations. A subvaluation v is a prime subvaluation of ϕ
(modulo W) if and only if v 
!
W
ϕ and there is no v′ ⊆ v s.t. v′ 
!
W
ϕ.
Our notion of prime subvaluation is closely related to Veltman’s defini-
tion of basis for a formula [54].7 A prime subvaluation of a formula ϕ is
thus one of the weakest states of truth in which ϕ is true. Hence, prime
subvaluations are just another way of seeing prime implicants [43] of ϕ. By
base(ϕ,W) we will denote the set of all prime subvaluations of ϕ modulo W.
Theorem 2.2 Let ϕ ∈ Fml and W be a set of valuations. Then for all
w ∈W, w  ϕ if and only if w 
∨
v∈base(ϕ,W)
∧
ℓ∈v ℓ.
6The dual notion, i.e., that of redundant atoms is also addressed in the literature [22],
with similar purposes.
7The author is indebted to Andreas Herzig for pointing this out.
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Proof: Right to left direction is straightforward. For the left to right di-
rection, if w  ϕ, then w  ϕ∗. Let w′ ⊆ w be the least subset of w still
satisfying ϕ∗. Clearly, w′ is a prime subvaluation of ϕ modulo W, and then
because w 
∧
ℓ∈w′ ℓ, the result follows.
2.4 Closeness between Models
When contracting a formula from a model, we will perform a change in its
structure. Because there can be several different ways of modifying a model
(not all of them minimal), we need a notion of distance between models to
identify those that are closest to the original one.
As we are going to see in more depth in what follows, changing a
model amounts to modifying its possible worlds or its accessibility rela-
tion. Hence, the distance between two PDL-models will depend upon the
distance between their sets of worlds and accessibility relations. These
here will be based on the symmetric difference between sets, defined as
X−˙Y = (X \ Y ) ∪ (Y \X).
Definition 2.10 (Closeness between PDL-Models) Let M = 〈W,R〉
be a model. Then M ′ = 〈W′,R′〉 is at least as close to M as M ′′ =
〈W′′,R′′〉, noted M ′ M M
′′, if and only if
• either W−˙W′ ⊆W−˙W′′
• or W−˙W′ = W−˙W′′ and R−˙R′ ⊆ R−˙R′′
Although simple, this notion of closeness is sufficient for our purposes
here, as we will see in the sequel. Notice that other distance notions could
have been considered as well, like e.g. the cardinality of symmetric differ-
ences. (See Section 9 for a discussion on this.)
3 Semantics of Action Theory Change
When admitting the possibility of a law Φ failing, one must ensure that Φ
becomes invalid, i.e., not true in at least one model of the dynamic domain.
Because there can be lots of such models, we may have a set M of models
in which Φ is (potentially) valid. Thus contracting Φ amounts to making it
no longer valid in this set of models. What are the operations that must
be carried out to achieve that? Throwing models out of M does not work,
since Φ will keep on being valid in all models of the remaining set. Thus one
should add new models to M. Which models? Well, models in which Φ is
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not true. But not any of such models: taking models falsifying Φ that are
too different from our original models will certainly violate minimal change.
Hence, we shall take some model M ∈ M as basis and manipulate it to
get a new model M ′ in which Φ is not true. In dynamic logic, the removal of
a law Φ from a model M = 〈W,R〉 means modifying the possible worlds or
the accessibility relation in M so that Φ becomes false. Such an operation
gives as result a set M−Φ of models each of which is no longer a model of Φ.
But if there are several candidates, which ones should we choose? We shall
take those models that are minimal modifications of the original M , i.e.,
those minimal w.r.t. M . Note that there can be more than one M
′ that is
minimal. Hence, because adding just one of these new models is enough to
invalidate Φ, we take all possible combinations M∪{M ′} of expanding our
original set of models by one of these minimal models. The result will be a
set of sets of models. In each set of models there will be one M ′ falsifying
Φ.
3.1 Model Contraction of Executability Laws
To contract an executability law ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤ from one model, one intuitively
removes arrows leaving ϕ-worlds. In order to succeed in the operation, we
have to guarantee that in the resulting model there will be at least one
ϕ-world with no departing a-arrow.
Definition 3.1 Let M = 〈W,R〉. M ′ = 〈W′,R′〉 ∈ M−
ϕ→〈a〉⊤ if and only if
• W′ = W
• R′ ⊆ R
• If (w,w′) ∈ R \ R′, then |=
M
w
ϕ
• There is w ∈W′ s.t. 6|=
M ′
w
ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤
Observe that M−
ϕ→〈a〉⊤ 6= ∅ if and only if ϕ is satisfiable in W. Moreover,
M ∈ M−
ϕ→〈a〉⊤ if and only if 6|=
M
ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤.
To get minimal change, we want such an operation to be minimal w.r.t.
the original model: one should remove a minimum set of arrows sufficient
to get the desired result.
Definition 3.2 contract(M , ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤) =
⋃
min{M−
ϕ→〈a〉⊤,M }
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And now we define the sets of possible models resulting from the con-
traction of an executability law in a set of models:
Definition 3.3 Let M be a set of models, and ϕ → 〈a〉⊤ an executability
law. Then
M−
ϕ→〈a〉⊤ = {M
′ :M′ =M∪{M ′},M ′ ∈ contract(M , ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤),M ∈ M}
In our running example, consider M = {M }, where M is the model in
Figure 4. When the agent discovers that even with a token she does not
manage to buy a coffee any more, she has to change her models in order
to admit (new) models with states where token is the case but from which
there is no buy-transition at all. Because having just one such world in
each new model is enough, taking those resulting models whose accessibil-
ity relations are maximal guarantees minimal change. Hence we will have
M−
token→〈buy〉⊤ = {M ∪ {M
′
1},M∪ {M
′
2},M∪ {M
′
3}}, where each M
′
i is
depicted in Figure 5.
M ′1 : t, c, h
¬t, c, h
t,¬c, h
¬t,¬c,¬h ¬t,¬c, ht,¬c,¬h
b
b
M ′2 : t, c, h
¬t, c, h
t,¬c, h
¬t,¬c,¬h ¬t,¬c, ht,¬c,¬h
b
b
M ′3 : t, c, h
¬t, c, h
t,¬c, h
¬t,¬c,¬h ¬t,¬c, ht,¬c,¬h
b b
Figure 5: Models resulting from contracting token → 〈buy〉⊤ in the model
M of Figure 4.
Clearly, if ϕ is not satisfied in M, i.e., |=
M
¬ϕ for all M ∈ M, then
the contraction of ϕ → 〈a〉⊤ does not succeed. In this case, ¬ϕ should be
contracted from the set of models (see further in this section).
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3.2 Model Contraction of Effect Laws
When the agent discovers that there may be cases where after buying she
gets no hot beverage, she must e.g. give up the belief token→ [buy]hot in her
set of models. This means that token ∧ 〈buy〉¬hot shall now be admitted in
at least one world of some of her new models of beliefs. Hence, to contract
an effect law ϕ→ [a]ψ from a given model, intuitively we have to add arrows
leaving ϕ-worlds to worlds satisfying ¬ψ. The challenge in such an operation
is how to guarantee minimal change.
In our example, when contracting token → [buy]hot in the model of
Figure 4 we add arrows from token-worlds to ¬hot-worlds. Because coffee→
hot, and then ¬hot → ¬coffee, this should also give 〈buy〉¬coffee in some
token-world (¬coffee is relevant to ¬hot, i.e., to have ¬hot we must have
¬coffee). This means that if we allow for 〈buy〉¬hot in some token-world, we
also have to allow for 〈buy〉¬coffee in that same world.
Hence, in our example one can add arrows from token-worlds to ¬hot ∧
¬coffee∧ token-worlds, as well as to ¬hot∧¬coffee∧¬token (Figure 6). For
instance, one can add a buy-arrow from {token,¬coffee,¬hot} to one of these
candidates (Figure 7).
M :
t, c, h
¬t, c, h
t,¬c, h
¬t,¬c,¬h ¬t,¬c, ht,¬c,¬h
b b
b
Figure 6: Candidate worlds to receive arrows from token-worlds.
Notice that adding the arrow to {token,¬coffee,¬hot} itself would make
us lose the effect ¬token, true after every execution of buy in the original
model (|=
M
token→ [buy]¬token). How do we preserve this law while allowing
for the new transition to a ¬hot-world? That is, how do we get rid of the
effect hot without losing effects that are not relevant for that? We here
develop an approach for this issue.
When adding a new arrow leaving a world w we intuitively want to
preserve as many effects as we had before doing so. To achieve this, it is
enough to preserve old effects only in w (because the remaining structure of
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M : t, c, h
¬t, c, h
t,¬c, h
¬t,¬c,¬h ¬t,¬c, ht,¬c,¬h
b b
b
b
b
Figure 7: Two candidate new buy-arrows to falsify token→ [buy]hot in M .
the model remains unchanged after adding the new arrow). Of course, we
cannot preserve effects that are inconsistent with ¬ψ (those will all be lost).
So, it suffices to preserve only the effects that are consistent with ¬ψ. To
achieve that we must observe what is true in w and in the target world w′:
• What changes from w to w′ (w′ \w) must be what is obliged to do so:
either because that is necessary to having ¬ψ in w′ or because that is
necessary to having another effect (independent of ¬ψ) in w′ that we
want to preserve.
• What does not change from w to w′ (w ∩ w′) should be what is al-
lowed to do so: certain literals are never preserved (like token in our
example), then when pointing the arrow to a world where it does not
change w.r.t. the leaving world (¬hot∧¬coffee∧ token in our example),
we lose effects that held in w before adding the arrow.
This means that the only things allowed to change in the candidate target
world must be those that are forced to change, either by some non-related
law or because of having ¬ψ modulo a set of states W. In other words, we
want the literals that change to be at most those that are sufficient to get ¬ψ
modulo W, while preserving the maximum of effects. Every change outside
that is not an intended one. Similarly, we want the literals that are preserved
in the target world to be at most those that are usually preserved in a given
set of models. Every preservation outside those may make us lose some law.
This looks like prime implicants, and that is where prime subvaluations play
their role: the worlds to which the new arrow will point are those whose
difference w.r.t. the departing world are literals that are relevant and whose
similarity w.r.t. it are literals that we know do not change.
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Definition 3.4 (Relevant Target Worlds) Let M = 〈W,R〉 be a model,
w,w′ ∈ W, M a set of models such that M ∈ M, and ϕ → [a]ψ an effect
law. Then w′ is a relevant target world of w w.r.t. ϕ → [a]ψ for M in M
if and only if
• |=
M
w
ϕ, 6|=
M
w′
ψ
• for all ℓ ∈ w′ \ w
– either there is v ∈ base(¬ψ,W) s.t. v ⊆ w′ and ℓ ∈ v
– or there is ψ′ ∈ Fml s.t. there is v′ ∈ base(ψ′,W) s.t. v′ ⊆ w′,
ℓ ∈ v′, and for every Mi ∈ M, |=
Mi
w
[a]ψ′
• for all ℓ ∈ w ∩w′
– either there is v ∈ base(¬ψ,W) s.t. v ⊆ w′ and ℓ ∈ v
– or there is Mi ∈ M such that 6|=
Mi
w
[a]¬ℓ
By RelTarget(w,ϕ→ [a]ψ,M ,M) we denote the set of all relevant target
worlds of w w.r.t. ϕ→ [a]ψ for M in M.
Note that we need the set of models M (and here we can suppose it
contains all models of the theory we want to change) because preserving
effects depends on what other effects hold in the other models that interest
us. We need to take them into account in the local operation of changing
one model:8
Definition 3.5 Let M = 〈W,R〉, and M be such that M ∈ M. Then
M ′ = 〈W′,R′〉 ∈ M−
ϕ→[a]ψ if and only if
• W′ = W
• R ⊆ R′
• If (w,w′) ∈ R′ \ R, then w′ ∈ RelTarget(w,ϕ→ [a]ψ,M ,M)
• There is w ∈W′ s.t. 6|=
M ′
w
ϕ→ [a]ψ
8The reason we do not need M in the definition of the local (one model) contraction
of executability laws M−ϕ→〈a〉⊤ is that when removing arrows there is no way of losing
effects, as every effect law that held in the world from which an arrow has been removed
remains true in the same world in the resulting model.
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Observe that M−
ϕ→[a]ψ 6= ∅ if and only if ϕ and ¬ψ are both satisfiable
in W. Moreover, M ∈ M−
ϕ→[a]ψ if and only if 6|=
M
ϕ→ [a]ψ.
Because having just one world where the law is no longer true in each
model is enough, taking those resulting models whose accessibility relations
are minimal w.r.t. the original one guarantees minimal change.
Definition 3.6 contract(M , ϕ→ [a]ψ) =
⋃
min{M−
ϕ→[a]ψ,M }
Now we can define the possible sets of models resulting from contracting
an effect law from a set of models:
Definition 3.7 Let M be a set of models, and ϕ → [a]ψ an effect law.
Then
M−
ϕ→[a]ψ = {M
′ :M′ =M∪{M ′},M ′ ∈ contract(M , ϕ→ [a]ψ),M ∈M}
Taking again M = {M }, where M is the model in Figure 4, after con-
tracting token→ [buy]hot fromM we getM−
token→[buy]hot = {M∪{M
′
1},M∪
{M ′2},M∪{M
′
3}}, where all M
′
i s are as depicted in Figure 8.
M ′1 : t, c, h
¬t, c, h
t,¬c, h
¬t,¬c,¬h ¬t,¬c, ht,¬c,¬h
b b
b
b
M ′2 : t, c, h
¬t, c, h
t,¬c, h
¬t,¬c,¬h ¬t,¬c, ht,¬c,¬h
b b
b
b
M ′3 : t, c, h
¬t, c, h
t,¬c, h
¬t,¬c,¬h ¬t,¬c, ht,¬c,¬h
b b
b
b
Figure 8: Models resulting from contracting token → [buy]hot in the model
M of Figure 4.
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In both cases where ϕ is not satisfiable in M or ψ is valid in M , of course
our operator does not succeed in falsifying ϕ→ [a]ψ (cf. end of Section 3.1).
Intuitively, prior to doing that we have to change our set of possible states.
This is what we address in the next section.
3.3 Model Contraction of Static Laws
When contracting a static law from a model, we want to admit the existence
of at least one (new) possible state falsifying it. This means that intuitively
we should add new worlds to the original model. This is quite easy. A very
delicate issue however is what to do with the accessibility relation: should
new arrows leave/arrive at the new world? If no arrow leaves the new added
world, we may lose some executability law. If some arrow leaves it, then we
may lose some effect law, the same holding if we add an arrow pointing to
the new world. On the other hand, if no arrow arrives at the new world,
what about the intuition? Is it intuitive to have an unreachable state?
All this discussion shows how drastic a change in the static laws may
be: it is a change in the underlying structure (possible states) of the world!
Changing it may have as consequence the loss of an effect law or an exe-
cutability law. What we can do is choose which laws we accept to lose and
postpone their change (by the other operators). Following the tradition in
the RAA community which states that executability laws are, in general,
more difficult to formalize than effect laws, and hence are more likely to
be incorrect, here we prefer not to change the accessibility relation, which
means preserving effect laws and postponing correction of executability laws,
if needed. (cf. Sections 4.3 and 10 below).
Definition 3.8 Let M = 〈W,R〉. M ′ = 〈W′,R′〉 ∈ M−ϕ if and only if
• W ⊆W′
• R = R′
• There is w ∈W′ s.t. 6|=
M ′
w
ϕ
Notice that we have M−ϕ = ∅ if and only if ϕ is a tautology. Moreover,
M ∈ M−ϕ if and only if 6|=
M
ϕ.
The minimal modifications of one model are defined as usual:
Definition 3.9 contract(M , ϕ) =
⋃
min{M−ϕ ,M }
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And now we define the sets of models resulting from contracting a static
law from a given set of models:
Definition 3.10 Let M be a set of models, and ϕ a static law. Then
M−ϕ = {M
′ :M′ =M∪ {M ′},M ′ ∈ contract(M , ϕ),M ∈M}
In our scenario example, ifM = {M }, whereM is the model in Figure 4,
then contracting coffee → hot from M would give us M−coffee→hot = {M ∪
{M ′1},M∪{M
′
2}}, where each M
′
i is as depicted in Figure 9.
M ′1 : t, c, h
¬t, c, h
t,¬c, h
¬t,¬c,¬h ¬t,¬c, ht,¬c,¬h
t, c,¬h
b b
b
M ′2 : t, c, h
¬t, c, h
t,¬c, h
¬t,¬c,¬h ¬t,¬c, ht,¬c,¬h
¬t, c,¬h
b b
b
Figure 9: Models resulting from contracting coffee → hot in the model M
of Figure 4.
Notice that by not modifying the accessibility relation all the effect laws
are preserved with minimal change. Moreover, our approach is in line with
intuition: when learning that a new state is now possible, we do not nec-
essarily know all the behavior of the actions in the new added state. We
may expect some action laws to hold in the new state (see Section 10 for
an alternative solution), but, with the information we dispose, not touching
the accessibility relation is the safest way of contracting static laws.
4 Syntactic Operators for Contraction of Laws
Now that we have defined the semantics of our theory change, we turn
our attention to the definition of syntactic operators for changing sets of
formulas.
As Nebel [40] says, “[. . . ] finite bases usually represent [. . . ] laws, and
when we are forced to change the theory we would like to stay as close
as possible to the original [. . . ] base.” Hence, besides the definition of
syntactical operators, we should also guarantee that they perform minimal
change.
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By T−Φ we denote in the sequel the result of contracting a law Φ from the
set of laws T.
4.1 Contracting Executability Laws
For the case of contracting ϕ → 〈a〉⊤ from an action theory, first we have
to ensure that the action a is still executable in all those contexts where ¬ϕ
is the case. Second, in order to get minimality, we must make a executable
in some contexts where ϕ is true, viz. all ϕ-worlds but one. This means
that we can have several action theories as outcome. Algorithm 1 gives a
syntactical operator to achieve this.
Algorithm 1 Erasure of an executability law
input: T, ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤
output: T−
ϕ→〈a〉⊤
1: T−
ϕ→〈a〉⊤
:= ∅
2: if T |=
PDL
ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤ then
3: for all π ∈ IP(S ∧ ϕ) do
4: for all A ⊆ atm(π) do
5: ϕA:=
∧
pi∈atm(pi)
pi∈A
pi ∧
∧
pi∈atm(pi)
pi /∈A
¬pi
6: if S 6|=
CPL
(π ∧ ϕA)→ ⊥ then
7: T ′:=
(
(T \ Xa) ∪
{(ϕi ∧ ¬(π ∧ ϕA))→ 〈a〉⊤ : ϕi → 〈a〉⊤ ∈ Xa}
)
8: T−
ϕ→〈a〉⊤
:= T−
ϕ→〈a〉⊤ ∪ {T
′}
9: else
10: T−
ϕ→〈a〉⊤
:= {T}
return T−
ϕ→〈a〉⊤
Observe that from the finiteness of T and that of atm(π), for any π ∈
IP(S ∧ ϕ), and the decidability of PDL [20] and of classical propositional
logic, it follows that Algorithm 1 terminates.
In our running example, contracting the executability law token →
〈buy〉⊤ from the action theory T would give us T−
token→〈buy〉⊤ = {T
′
1 ,T
′
2 ,T
′
3},
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where:
T ′1 =


coffee→ hot,¬coffee→ [buy]coffee,
token→ [buy]¬token,¬token→ [buy]⊥,
coffee→ [buy]coffee, hot→ [buy]hot,
(token ∧ ¬coffee ∧ hot)→ 〈buy〉⊤,
(token ∧ ¬coffee ∧ ¬hot)→ 〈buy〉⊤


T ′2 =


coffee→ hot,¬coffee→ [buy]coffee,
token→ [buy]¬token,¬token→ [buy]⊥,
coffee→ [buy]coffee, hot→ [buy]hot,
(token ∧ coffee ∧ hot)→ 〈buy〉⊤,
(token ∧ ¬coffee ∧ ¬hot)→ 〈buy〉⊤


T ′3 =


coffee→ hot,¬coffee→ [buy]coffee,
token→ [buy]¬token,¬token→ [buy]⊥,
coffee→ [buy]coffee, hot→ [buy]hot,
(token ∧ coffee ∧ hot)→ 〈buy〉⊤,
(token ∧ ¬coffee ∧ hot)→ 〈buy〉⊤


Now the knowledge engineer has only to choose which theory is more in
line with her intuitions and implement the changes (cf. Figure 5).
4.2 Contracting Effect Laws
When contracting ϕ→ [a]ψ from a theory T, intuitively we should contract
some effect laws that preclude ¬ψ in target worlds. In order to cope with
minimality, we must change only those laws that are relevant to ϕ→ [a]ψ.
Let Eϕ,ψa denote a minimum subset of Ea such that S , E
ϕ,ψ
a |=
PDL
ϕ→ [a]ψ.
In the case the theory is modular [25] (see further), such a set always exists.
Moreover, note that there can be more than one such a set, in which case
we denote them (Eϕ,ψa )1, . . . , (E
ϕ,ψ
a )n. Let
E−a =
⋃
1≤i≤n
(Eϕ,ψa )i
The laws in E−a will serve as guidelines to get rid of ϕ→ [a]ψ in the theory.
The first thing we must do is to ensure that action a still has effect ψ
in all those contexts in which ϕ does not hold. This means we shall weaken
the laws in Eϕ,ψa specializing them to ¬ϕ. Now, we need to preserve all
old effects in all ϕ-worlds but one. To achieve that we specialize the above
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laws to each possible valuation (maximal conjunction of literals) satisfying
ϕ but one. Then, in the left ϕ-valuation, we must ensure that action a has
either its old effects or ¬ψ as outcome. We achieve that by weakening the
consequent of the laws in E−a . Finally, in order to get minimal change, we
must ensure that all literals in this ϕ-valuation that are not forced to change
in ¬ψ-worlds should be preserved. We do this by stating an effect law of the
form (ϕk ∧ ℓ) → [a](ψ ∨ ℓ), where ϕk is the above ϕ-valuation. The reason
this is needed is clear: there can be several ¬ψ-valuations, and as far as we
want at most one to be reachable from the ϕk-world, we should force it to
be the one whose difference to this ϕk-valuation is minimal.
Again, the result will be a set of action theories. Algorithm 2 below gives
the operator.
The reader is invited to check that Algorithm 2 always terminates (cf.
Section 4.1).
For an example of execution of the algorithm, suppose we want to con-
tract the effect law token→ [buy]hot from our theory T. We first determine
the minimum sets of effect laws that together with S entail token→ [buy]hot.
They are
(E token,hotbuy )1 =
{
coffee→ [buy]coffee,
¬coffee→ [buy]coffee
}
(E token,hotbuy )2 =
{
hot→ [buy]hot,
¬coffee→ [buy]coffee
}
Now for each context where token is the case, we weaken the effect laws in
E−buy = (E
token,hot
buy )1 ∪ (E
token,hot
buy )2. Given S = {coffee → hot}, such contexts
are token ∧ coffee ∧ hot, token ∧ ¬coffee ∧ ¬hot and token ∧ ¬coffee ∧ hot.
For token ∧ coffee ∧ hot: we replace in T the laws from E−buy by

(coffee ∧ ¬(token ∧ coffee ∧ hot))→ [buy]coffee,
(hot ∧ ¬(token ∧ coffee ∧ hot))→ [buy]hot,
(¬coffee ∧ ¬(token ∧ coffee ∧ hot))→ [buy]coffee


so that we preserve their effects in all possible contexts but token∧coffee∧hot.
Now, in order to preserve some effects in token ∧ coffee ∧ hot-contexts while
allowing for reachable ¬hot-worlds, we add the laws:{
(token ∧ coffee ∧ hot)→ [buy](coffee ∨ ¬hot),
(token ∧ coffee ∧ hot)→ [buy](hot ∨ ¬coffee)
}
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Algorithm 2 Contraction of an effect law
input: T, ϕ→ [a]ψ
output: T−
ϕ→[a]ψ
1: T−
ϕ→[a]ψ
:= ∅
2: if T |=
PDL
ϕ→ [a]ψ then
3: for all π ∈ IP(S ∧ ϕ) do
4: for all A ⊆ atm(π) do
5: ϕA:=
∧
pi∈atm(pi)
pi∈A
pi ∧
∧
pi∈atm(pi)
pi /∈A
¬pi
6: if S 6|=
CPL
(π ∧ ϕA)→ ⊥ then
7: for all π′ ∈ IP(S ∧ ¬ψ) do
8: T ′:=


(T \ E−a ) ∪
{(ϕi ∧ ¬(π ∧ ϕA))→ [a]ψi : ϕi → [a]ψi ∈ E−a } ∪
{(ϕi ∧ π ∧ ϕA)→ [a](ψi ∨ π
′) : ϕi → [a]ψi ∈ E
−
a }


9: for all L ⊆ Lit do
10: if S |=
CPL
(π ∧ϕA)→
∧
ℓ∈L ℓ and S 6|=CPL(π
′ ∧
∧
ℓ∈L ℓ)→ ⊥
then
11: for all ℓ ∈ L do
12: if T 6|=
PDL
(π ∧ ϕA ∧ ℓ)→ [a]¬ℓ or ℓ ∈ π
′ then
13: T ′:= T ′ ∪ {(π ∧ ϕA ∧ ℓ)→ [a](ψ ∨ ℓ)}
14: T−
ϕ→[a]ψ
:= T−
ϕ→[a]ψ ∪ {T
′}
15: else
16: T−
ϕ→[a]ψ
:= {T}
return T−
ϕ→[a]ψ
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Now, we search all possible combinations of laws from Ebuy that apply on
token ∧ coffee ∧ hot contexts and find token→ [buy]¬token. Because ¬token
must be true after every execution of buy, we do not state the law (token ∧
coffee ∧ hot)→ [buy](hot ∨ token), and end up with the theory:
T ′1 =


coffee→ hot, token→ 〈buy〉⊤,
token→ [buy]¬token,¬token→ [buy]⊥,
(coffee ∧ ¬(token ∧ coffee ∧ hot))→ [buy]coffee,
(hot ∧ ¬(token ∧ coffee ∧ hot))→ [buy]hot,
(¬coffee ∧ ¬(token ∧ coffee ∧ hot))→ [buy]coffee,
(token ∧ coffee ∧ hot)→ [buy](coffee ∨ ¬hot),
(token ∧ coffee ∧ hot)→ [buy](hot ∨ ¬coffee)


On the other hand, if in our language we also had an atom p with the same
theory T, then we should add a law (token∧coffee∧hot∧p)→ [buy](hot∨p)
to meet minimal change by preserving effects that are not relevant to ¬ψ.
The execution for contexts token∧¬coffee∧¬hot and token∧¬coffee∧hot
are analogous and the algorithm ends with T−
token→[buy]hot = {T
′
1 ,T
′
2 ,T
′
3},
where:
T ′2 =


coffee→ hot, token→ 〈buy〉⊤,
token→ [buy]¬token,¬token→ [buy]⊥,
(coffee ∧ ¬(token ∧ ¬coffee ∧ ¬hot))→ [buy]coffee,
(hot ∧ ¬(token ∧ ¬coffee ∧ ¬hot))→ [buy]hot,
(¬coffee ∧ ¬(token ∧ ¬coffee ∧ ¬hot))→ [buy]coffee,
(token ∧ ¬coffee ∧ ¬hot)→ [buy](coffee ∨ ¬hot)


T ′3 =


coffee→ hot, token→ 〈buy〉⊤,
token→ [buy]¬token,¬token→ [buy]⊥,
(coffee ∧ ¬(token ∧ ¬coffee ∧ hot))→ [buy]coffee,
(hot ∧ ¬(token ∧ ¬coffee ∧ hot))→ [buy]hot,
(¬coffee ∧ ¬(token ∧ ¬coffee ∧ hot))→ [buy]coffee,
(token ∧ ¬coffee ∧ hot)→ [buy](hot ∨ ¬coffee),
(token ∧ ¬coffee ∧ hot)→ [buy](coffee ∨ ¬hot)


Looking at Figure 8, we can see the correspondence between these the-
ories and their respective models.
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4.3 Contracting Static Laws
Finally, in order to contract a static law from a theory, we can use any
contraction/erasure operator ⊖ for classical logic. Because contracting static
laws means admitting new possible states (cf. the semantics), just modifying
the set S of static laws may not be enough for the dynamic logic case. Since
we in general do not necessarily know the behavior of the actions in a new
discovered state of the world, a careful approach is to change the theory so
that all action laws remain the same in the contexts where the contracted
law is the case. In our example, if when contracting the law coffee→ hot we
are not sure whether buy is still executable or not, then we should weaken our
executability laws specializing them to the context coffee → hot, and make
buy a priori inexecutable in all ¬(coffee→ hot) contexts. The operator given
in Algorithm 3 formalizes this.
Algorithm 3 Contraction of a static law
input: T, ϕ
output: T−ϕ
1: T−ϕ:= ∅
2: if S |=
CPL
ϕ then
3: for all S− ∈ S ⊖ ϕ do
4: T ′:=


((T \ S ) ∪ S−) \ Xa ∪
{(ϕi ∧ ϕ)→ 〈a〉⊤ : ϕi → 〈a〉⊤ ∈ Xa} ∪
{¬ϕ→ [a]⊥}


5: T−ϕ:= T
−
ϕ ∪ {T
′}
6: else
7: T−ϕ:= {T}
return T−ϕ
In our running example, contracting the law coffee → hot from T pro-
duces T−coffee→hot = {T
′
1 ,T
′
2}, where
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T ′1 =


¬(¬token ∧ coffee ∧ ¬hot),
(token ∧ coffee→ hot)→ 〈buy〉⊤,
¬coffee→ [buy]coffee, token→ [buy]¬token,
¬token→ [buy]⊥, coffee→ [buy]coffee,
hot→ [buy]hot, (coffee ∧ ¬hot)→ [buy]⊥


T ′2 =


¬(token ∧ coffee ∧ ¬hot),
(token ∧ coffee→ hot)→ 〈buy〉⊤,
¬coffee→ [buy]coffee, token→ [buy]¬token,
¬token→ [buy]⊥, coffee→ [buy]coffee,
hot→ [buy]hot, (coffee ∧ ¬hot)→ [buy]⊥


Observe that the effect laws are not affected by the change: as far as we
do not pronounce ourselves about the executability of some action in the
new added world, all the effect laws remain true in it.
If the knowledge engineer is not happy with (coffee ∧ ¬hot) → [buy]⊥,
she can contract this formula from the theory using Algorithm 2. Ideally,
besides stating that buy is executable in the context coffee∧¬hot, we should
want to specify its outcome in this context as well. For example, we could
want (coffee∧¬hot)→ 〈buy〉hot to be true in the result. This would require
theory revision. See Section 7 for the semantics of such an operation.
5 Correctness of the Operators
We here address the correctness of our algorithms w.r.t. our semantics for
contraction.
5.1 Two Counter-Examples
Let the theory T = {p1 → 〈a〉⊤, (¬p1 ∨ p2) → [a]⊥, [a]¬p2} and consider
its model M depicted in Figure 10. (Notice that T |=
PDL
¬(p1 ∧ p2).) When
contracting p1 → [a]¬p2 in M , we get M
′ in Figure 10.
Now contracting p1 → [a]¬p2 from T using Algorithm 2 gives T
−
p1→[a]¬p2
=
{T ′}, where
T ′ =


p1 → 〈a〉⊤, (¬p1 ∨ p2)→ [a]⊥,
(p1 ∧ ¬p2)→ [a](¬p2 ∨ p2),
(p1 ∧ ¬p2)→ [a](¬p2 ∨ p1)


Notice that the formula (p1∧¬p2)→ [a](¬p2∨p1) is put in T
′ by Algorithm 2
because there is {p1} ⊆ Lit such that S 6|=CPL (p1 ∧ p2) → ⊥ and T 6|=PDL
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M :
p1,¬p2 ¬p1,¬p2
¬p1, p2
a
a
M ′ :
p1,¬p2 ¬p1,¬p2
¬p1, p2
a
a
a
Figure 10: A model M of T and the result M ′ of contracting p1 → [a]¬p2
in it.
(p1 ∧ ¬p2)→ [a]¬p1. Clearly 6|=
M ′
T ′ and no theory in T−
p1→[a]¬p2
has M ′ as
model. This means that the contraction operators are not correct.
This issue arises because Algorithm 2 tries to allow an arrow from the
p1∧¬p2-world to a p2-world that is closest to it, viz. {p1, p2}, but has no way
of knowing that such a world does not exist. A remedy for that is replacing
the test T 6⊢
PDL
(π′ ∧
∧
ℓ∈L ℓ) → ⊥ for S 6⊢CPL (π
′ ∧
∧
ℓ∈L ℓ) → ⊥, but that
would increase even more the complexity of the algorithm. A better option
would be to have S ‘complete enough’ to allow the algorithm to determine
the worlds to which a new transition could exist.
The other way round, it does not hold in general that the models of
each T ′ ∈ T−Φ result from the semantic contraction of models of T by Φ.
To see this suppose that there is only one atom p and one action a, and
consider the action theory T = {p → [a]⊥, 〈a〉⊤}. The only model of T is
M = 〈{{¬p}}, {({¬p}, {¬p})}〉 in Figure 11.
M :
¬p
a
M ′ :
¬p p
a
Figure 11: Incompleteness of contraction: a model M of T and a model M ′
of the theory resulting from contracting p→ 〈a〉⊤ from T.
By definition, contract(M , p → 〈a〉⊤) = {M }. On the other hand,
T−
p→〈a〉⊤ is the singleton {T
′} such that T ′ = {p→ [a]⊥,¬p→ 〈a〉⊤}. Then
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M ′ = 〈{{¬p}, {p}}, ({¬p}, {¬p})〉 in Figure 11 is a model of the contracted
theory. Clearly, M ′ does not result from the semantic contraction of p →
〈a〉⊤ from M : while ¬p is valid in the contraction of the models of T, it
is not valid in the models of T ′. This means that the operators are not
complete.
This problem occurs because, in our example, the worlds that are for-
bidden by T, e.g. {p}, are not preserved as such in T ′. When contracting an
executability or an effect law, we are not supposed to change the possible
worlds of a theory (cf. Section 3).
Fortunately correctness of the algorithms w.r.t. our semantics can be
guaranteed for those theories whose S is maximal, i.e., the set of static laws
in S alone determine what worlds are authorized in the models of the theory.
This is the principle of modularity [25] and we briefly review it in the next
section.
5.2 Modular Theories
Definition 5.1 (Modularity [25]) An action theory T is modular if and
only if for every ϕ ∈ Fml, if T |=
PDL
ϕ, then S |=
CPL
ϕ.
For an example of a non-modular theory, suppose that the action theory
T of our coffee machine scenario were stated as
T =


coffee→ hot, 〈buy〉⊤,
¬coffee→ [buy]coffee,
token→ [buy]¬token,¬token→ [buy]⊥,
coffee→ [buy]coffee, hot→ [buy]hot


The modified law is underlined: we have (in this case wrongly) stated that
the agent can always buy at the machine. Then T |=
PDL
token and S 6|=
CPL
token.
As the underlying multimodal logic is independently axiomatized (see
Section 2.1), we can use the algorithms given by Herzig and Varzinczak [25]
to check whether an action theory satisfies the principle of modularity.
Whenever this is not the case, the algorithms return the Boolean formu-
las entailed by the theory that are not consequences of S alone. For the
theory T above, they would return {token}: as we stated 〈buy〉⊤, from this
and ¬token → [buy]⊥ we get T |=
PDL
token. Because S 6|=
CPL
token, token is
what is called an implicit static law [23] of T.9
9Implicit static laws are very closely related to veridical paradoxes [44]. It turns out
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Modular theories have interesting properties. For example, consistency
can be checked by just checking consistency of the static laws in S : if T is
modular, then T |=
PDL
⊥ if and only if S |=
CPL
⊥. Deduction of effect laws does
not need the executability ones and vice versa. Deduction of an effect of a
sequence of actions a1; . . . ; an (prediction) does not need to take into account
the effect laws for actions other than a1, . . . , an. This applies in particular
to plan validation when deciding whether 〈a1; . . . ; an〉ϕ is the case.
Similar notions to modularity have been investigated in the literature on
regulation consistency [7], Situation Calculus [2, 24], DL ontologies [8, 26]
and also in dynamic logic [56]. For more details on modularity in action
theories, see the work by Varzinczak [51].
Theorem 5.1 T is modular if and only if the big model of T is a model of T.
Proof: Let Mbig = 〈Wbig,Rbig〉 be the big model of T.
(⇒): By definition, Mbig is such that |=
MbigS ∧ E . It remains to show that
|=
MbigX . Let ϕi → 〈a〉⊤ ∈ Xa, and let w ∈Wbig be such that |=
Mbig
w
ϕi. There-
fore for all ϕj ∈ Fml such that T |=
PDL
ϕj → [a]⊥, we must have 6|=
Mbig
w
ϕj ,
because T |=
PDL
¬(ϕi∧ϕj), and as T is modular, S |=
CPL
¬(ϕi ∧ϕj), and hence
|=
Mbig¬(ϕi ∧ ϕj). Then by the construction of Mbig, there is some w
′ ∈Wbig
such that |=
Mbig
w′
ψ for all ϕ → [a]ψ ∈ Ea such that |=
Mbig
w
ϕ. Thus Ra(w) 6= ∅
and |=
Mbigϕi → 〈a〉⊤.
(⇐): Suppose T is not modular. Then there must be some ϕ ∈ Fml such
that T |=
PDL
ϕ and S 6|=
CPL
ϕ. This means that there is v ∈ val(S ) such that
v 6 ϕ. As v ∈ Wbig (because Wbig contains all possible valuations of S ),
Mbig is not a model of T.
5.3 Correctness Under Modularity
The following theorem establishes that the semantic contraction of a formula
Φ from the set of models of an action theory T produces models of some
contracted theory in T−Φ .
Theorem 5.2 Let T be modular, and Φ be a law. For all M′ ∈ M−Φ such
that |=
M
T for every M ∈ M, there is T ′ ∈ T−Φ such that |=
M ′
T ′ for every
M ′ ∈M′.
that they are not always intuitive. For a deep discussion on implicit static laws, see the
article by Herzig and Varzinczak [27].
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Proof: See Appendix A.
The next theorem establishes the other way round: models of theories
in T−Φ are all models of the semantic contraction of Φ from models of T.
Theorem 5.3 Let T be modular, Φ a law, and T ′ ∈ T−Φ . For all M
′ such
that |=
M ′
T ′, there is M′ ∈ M−Φ such that M
′ ∈ M′ and |=
M
T for every
M ∈ M.
Proof: See Appendix B.
With these two theorems one gets correctness of the operators:
Corollary 5.1 Let T be modular, Φ a law, and T ′ ∈ T−Φ . Then T
′ |=
PDL
Ψ
if and only if |=
M ′
Ψ for every M ′ ∈ M′ such that M′ ∈ M−Φ for some M
such that |=
M
T for all M ∈ M.
Proof:
(⇒): Let M ′ be such that |=
M ′
T ′. By Theorem 5.3, there is M′ ∈ M−Φ such
that M ′ ∈ M′ for some M such that |=
M
T for all M ∈ M. From this and
T ′ |=
PDL
Ψ , we have |=
M ′
Ψ .
(⇐): Suppose T ′ 6|=
PDL
Ψ . (We show that there is some model M ′ ∈ M′ such
that M′ ∈ M−Φ for some M with |=
M
T for all M ∈ M, and 6|=
M ′
Ψ .)
Given that T is modular, by Lemma B.1 T ′ is modular, too. Then, by
Lemma B.3, there is M ′ = 〈val(S ′),R′〉 such that 6|=
M ′
Ψ . Clearly |=
M ′
T ′, and
from Lemma B.4 the result follows.
6 Assessment of Postulates for Change
Do our action theory change operators satisfy the classical postulates for
change? Before answering this question, one should ask: do our operators
behave like revision or update operators? We here address this issue and
then show which postulates for theory change are satisfied by our definitions.
6.1 Contraction or Erasure?
The distinction between revision/contraction and update/erasure for classi-
cal theories is historically controversial in the literature. The same is true
for the case of modal theories describing actions and their effects. We here
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rephrase Katsuno and Mendelzon’s definitions [31] in our terms so that we
can see to which one our method is closer.
In Katsuno and Mendelzon’s view, contracting a law Φ from an action
theory T intuitively means that the description of the possible behavior of
the dynamic world T must be adjusted to the possibility of Φ being false.
This amounts to selecting from the models of ¬Φ those that are closest to
models of T and allow them as models of the result.
In contrast, update methods select, for each model M of T, the set of
models of Φ that are closest to M . Erasing Φ from T means adding models
to T; for each model M , we add all those models closest to M in which Φ is
false. Hence, from our constructions so far it seems that our operators are
closer to update than to revision.
Moreover, according to Katsuno and Mendelzon’s view [31], our change
operators would also be classified as update because we make modifications
in each model independently, i.e., without changing other models.10 Besides
that, in our setting a different ordering on the resulting models is induced
by each model of T (see Definitions 3.3, 3.7 and 3.10), which according to
Katsuno and Mendelzon is a typical property of an update/erasure method.
Nevertheless, things get quite different when it comes to the postulates
for theory change.
6.2 The Postulates
We here analyze the behavior of our action theory change operators w.r.t.
Katsuno and Mendelzon’s postulates and variants. Let T = S ∪E ∪X denote
an action theory and Φ denote a law.
Monotonicity Postulate: T |=
PDL
T ′, for all T ′ ∈ T−Φ .
This postulate is our version of Katsuno and Mendelzon’s (C1) and (E1)
postulates for contraction and erasure, respectively, and is satisfied by our
change operators. The proof is in Lemma A.1. Such a postulate is not sat-
isfied by the operators proposed by Herzig et al. [21]: there when removing
e.g. an executability law ϕ → 〈a〉⊤ one may make ϕ → [a]⊥ valid in all
models of the resulting theory.
Preservation Postulate: If T 6|=
PDL
Φ, then |=
PDL
T ↔ T ′, for all T ′ ∈ T−Φ .
10Even if when contracting an effect law from one particular model we need to check
the other models of the theory, those are not modified.
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This is Katsuno and Mendelzon’s (C2) postulate. Our operators satisfy
it as far as whenever T 6|=
PDL
Φ, then the models of the resulting theory are
exactly the models of T, because these are the minimal models falsifying Φ.
The corresponding version of Katsuno and Mendelzon’s (E2) postulate
about erasure, i.e., if T |=
PDL
¬Φ, then |=
PDL
T ↔ T ′, for all T ′ ∈ T−Φ , is clearly
also satisfied by our operators as a special case of the postulate above.
Satisfaction of (C2) indicates that our operators are closer to contraction
than to erasure.
Success Postulate: If T 6|=
PDL
⊥ and 6|=
PDL
Φ, then T ′ 6|=
PDL
Φ, for all T ′ ∈ T−Φ .
This postulate is our version of Katsuno and Mendelzon’s (C3) and (E3)
postulates. If Φ is a propositional ϕ ∈ Fml, our operators satisfy it, as long as
the classical propositional change operator satisfies it. For the general case,
however, as stated the postulate is not always satisfied. This is shown by the
following example: let T = {¬p, 〈a〉⊤, p → [a]⊥}. Note that T is modular
and consistent. Now, contracting the (contingent) formula p → 〈a〉⊤ from
T gives us T ′ = T. Clearly T ′ |=
PDL
p→ 〈a〉⊤. This happens because, despite
not being a tautology, p → 〈a〉⊤ is a ‘trivial’ formula w.r.t. T: since ¬p is
valid in all T-models, p→ 〈a〉⊤ is trivially true in these models.
Fortunately, for all those formulas that are non-trivial consequences of
the theory, our operators guarantee success of contraction:
Theorem 6.1 Let T be consistent, and Φ be an executability or an effect
law such that S 6|=
PDL
Φ. If T is modular, then T ′ 6|=
PDL
Φ for every T ′ ∈ T−Φ .
Proof: Suppose there is T ′ ∈ T−Φ such that T
′ |=
PDL
Φ. As T is modular,
Corollary 5.1 gives us |=
M ′
Φ for every M ′ ∈ M′ such that M′ ∈ M−Φ , where
M = {M :|=
M
T and M = 〈val(S ),R〉}.
If |=
M ′
Φ for every M ′ ∈ M′, then even for M ′′ ∈ M′ \M we have |=
M ′′
Φ.
But M ′′ ∈ M−Φ for some M ∈ M, and by definition 6|=
M ′′
Φ. Hence M−Φ = ∅,
and then the truth of Φ in M does not depend on Ra. Then, whether Φ has
the form ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤ or ϕ→ [a]ψ, for ϕ,ψ ∈ Fml, this holds only if S |=
CPL
¬ϕ
(see Definitions 3.1 and 3.5), in which case we get S |=
PDL
Φ.
Equivalences Postulate: If |=
PDL
T1 ↔ T2 and |=
PDL
Φ1 ↔ Φ2, then |=
PDL
T ′1 ↔ T
′
2 , for T
′
1 ∈ (T1)
−
Φ2 and T
′
2 ∈ (T2)
−
Φ1
.
This postulate corresponds to Katsuno and Mendelzon’s (C4) and (E4)
postulates. Under modularity and the assumption that the propositional
change operator satisfies (C4)/(E4), our operations satisfy this postulate:
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Theorem 6.2 Let T1 and T2 be modular. If |=
PDL
T1 ↔ T2 and |=
PDL
Φ1 ↔ Φ2,
then for each T ′1 ∈ (T1)
−
Φ2
there is T ′2 ∈ (T2)
−
Φ1
such that |=
PDL
T ′1 ↔ T
′
2 , and
vice-versa.
Proof: The proof follows straight from our results: since |=
PDL
T1 ↔ T2 and
|=
PDL
Φ1 ↔ Φ2, they have pairwise the same models. Hence, given M such
that |=
M
T1 and |=
M
T2, the semantic contraction of Φ1 and that of Φ2 from M
have the same operations on M . As T1 and T2 are modular, Corollary 5.1
guarantees we get the same syntactical results. Moreover, as the classical
operator ⊖ satisfies (C4)/(E4), if follows that |=
PDL
T ′1 ↔ T
′
2 .
Recovery Postulate: T ′ ∪ {Φ} |=
PDL
T, for all T ′ ∈ T−Φ .
This is the action theory counterpart of Katsuno and Mendelzon’s (C5)
and (E5) postulates. Again we rely on modularity in order to satisfy it.
Theorem 6.3 Let T be modular. T ′ ∪ {Φ} |=
PDL
T, for all T ′ ∈ T−Φ .
Proof: If T 6|=
PDL
Φ, because our operators satisfy the preservation postulate,
T ′ = T, and then the result follows by monotonicity.
Let T |=
PDL
Φ, and let M′ denote the set of all models of T ′. As T is
modular, by Corollary 5.1 every M ′ ∈ M′ is such that either |=
M ′
T (and
then |=
M ′
Φ) or M ′ ∈ contract(M , Φ) (and then M ′ ∈ M−Φ ) for some M
such that |=
M
T.
Let M′′ denote the set of all models of T ′ ∪ {Φ}. Clearly M′′ ⊆ M′,
by monotonicity. Moreover, every M ′′ ∈ M′′ is such that |=
M ′′
Φ, hence
M ′′ /∈ M−Φ for every M such that |=
M
T, and then M ′′ /∈ contract(M , Φ),
for any M model of T. Thus M ′′ is a model of T and then T ′ ∪ {Φ} |=
PDL
T.
Let
∨
T−Φ denote the disjunction of all T
′ in T−Φ .
Disjunctive rule: (T1 ∨ T2)
−
Φ is equivalent to
∨
(T1)
−
Φ ∨
∨
(T2)
−
Φ .
This is our version of (E8) erasure postulate by Katsuno and Mendelzon.
Clearly our syntactical operators do not manage to contract a law from a
disjunction of theories T1 ∨ T2. Nevertheless, by proving that it holds in
the semantics, from the correctness of our operators, we get an equivalent
operation. Again the fact that the theories under concern are modular gives
us the result.
35
Theorem 6.4 Let T1 and T2 be modular, and Φ be a law. Then
|=
PDL
∨
(T1 ∨ T2)
−
Φ ↔ (
∨
(T1)
−
Φ ∨
∨
(T2)
−
Φ )
Proof:
(⇐): Let M ′ be such that |=
M ′ ∨
(T1)
−
Φ ∨
∨
(T2)
−
Φ . Then |=
M ′ ∨
(T1)
−
Φ or
|=
M ′ ∨
(T2)
−
Φ . Suppose |=
M ′ ∨
(T1)
−
Φ (the other case is analogous). Then
there is (T1)
′ ∈ (T1)
−
Φ such that |=
M ′
(T1)
′. Then by Corollary 5.1, there is
M′ ∈ M−Φ such that M
′ ∈ M′, for M a set of models of T1. Then M
′ is
a model resulting from contracting Φ from models of T1 , and then M
′ also
results from contracting Φ in models of T1∨T2, viz. those models of T1. Then
by Corollary 5.1, there is (T1 ∨ T2)
′ ∈ (T1 ∨ T2)
−
Φ such that |=
M ′
(T1 ∨ T2)
′,
and then |=
M ′∨
(T1 ∨ T2)
−
Φ .
(⇒): Let M ′ be such that |=
M ′ ∨
(T1 ∨ T2)
−
Φ . Then there is (T1 ∨ T2)
′ ∈
(T1 ∨ T2)
−
Φ such that |=
M ′
(T1 ∨ T2)
′. By Corollary 5.1, there is M′ ∈ M−Φ
such that M ′ ∈ M′, for M a set of models of T1 ∨ T2. Then M ′ is a model
resulting from contracting Φ from models of T1 ∨ T2. Hence M
′ results
from contracting Φ from models of T1 or from models of T2. Suppose the
former is the case (the second is analogous). Then by Corollary 5.1 there is
(T1)
′ ∈ (T1)
−
Φ such that |=
M ′
(T1)
′, and then |=
M ′∨
(T1)
−
Φ .
We have thus shown that our constructions satisfy (E8) postulate. Nev-
ertheless there is no evidence whether it is really expected here. This sup-
ports our position that our operators’ behavior is closer to contraction than
to erasure. To finish up we state a new postulate:
Preservation of modularity: If T is modular, then every T ′ ∈ T−Φ is
modular.
Changing a modular theory should not make it nonmodular. This is
not a standard postulate, but we think that as a good property modularity
should be preserved across changing an action theory. If so, this means
that whether a theory is modular or not can be checked once for all and
one does not need to care about it during the future evolution of the action
theory, i.e., when other changes will be made on it. Our operators satisfy
this postulate and the proof is given in Appendix B.
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7 A Semantics for Action Theory Revision
So far we have analyzed the case of contraction: when evolving a theory
one realizes that it is too strong and hence it has to be weakened. Let’s
now take a look at the other way round, i.e., the theory is too liberal and
the agent discovers new laws about the world that should be added to her
beliefs, which amounts to strengthening them.
Suppose the action theory of our scenario example were initially stated
as follows:
T =


coffee→ hot, token→ 〈buy〉⊤,
¬coffee→ [buy]coffee,¬token→ [buy]⊥,
coffee→ [buy]coffee, hot→ [buy]hot


Then the big-model of T is as shown in Figure 12.
M :
t, c, h
¬t, c, h
t,¬c, h
¬t,¬c,¬h ¬t,¬c, ht,¬c,¬h
b b
b
b
b
b
Figure 12: Model of the new initial action domain description.
Looking at model M in Figure 12 we can see that, for example, the
agent does not know that she loses her token every time she buys coffee at
the machine. This is a new law that she should incorporate to her knowledge
base at some stage of her action theory evolution.
Contrary to contraction, where we want the negation of some law to
become satisfiable, in revision we want to make a new law valid. This means
that one has to eliminate all cases satisfying its negation. This depicts
the duality between revision and contraction: whereas in the latter one
invalidates a formula by making its negation satisfiable, in the former one
makes a formula valid by forcing its negation to be unsatisfiable prior to
adding the new law to the theory.
The idea behind our semantics is as follows: we initially have a set of
models M in which a given formula Φ is (potentially) not valid, i.e., Φ is
37
(possibly) not true in every model in M. In the result we want to have
only models of Φ. Adding Φ-models to M is of no help. Moreover, adding
models makes us lose laws: the corresponding resulting theory would be
more liberal.
One solution amounts to deleting from M those models that are not Φ-
models. Of course removing only some of them does not solve the problem,
we must delete every such a model. By doing that, all resulting models will
be models of Φ. (This corresponds to theory expansion, when the resulting
theory is satisfiable.) However, if M contains no model of Φ, we will end
up with ∅. Consequence: the resulting theory is inconsistent. (This is the
main revision problem.) In this case the solution is to substitute each model
M in M by its nearest modification M ⋆Φ that makes Φ true. This lets us
to keep as close as possible to the original models we had. But, what if for
one model in M there are several minimal (incomparable) modifications of
it validating Φ? In that case we will consider all of them. The result will
also be a list of models M⋆Φ, all being models of Φ.
Before defining revision of sets of models, we present what modifications
of (individual) models are.
7.1 Revising a Model by a Static Law
Suppose that our coffee deliverer agent discovers that the only hot beverage
that is served on the machine is coffee. In this case, she might want to revise
her beliefs with the new static law ¬coffee → ¬hot: she cannot hold a hot
beverage that is not a coffee.
Considering the model depicted in Figure 12, one sees that the formula
¬coffee∧hot is satisfiable. As we do not want this, the first step is to remove
all worlds in which ¬coffee ∧ hot is true. The second step is to guarantee
that all the remaining worlds satisfy the new law. Such an issue has been
largely addressed in the literature on propositional belief base revision and
update [15, 55, 31, 22]. Here we can achieve that with a semantics similar
to that of classical revision operators: basically one can change the set of
possible valuations, by removing or adding worlds.
In our example, removing the possible worlds {t,¬c, h} and {¬t,¬c, h}
would do the job (there is no need to add new valuations since the new
incoming law is satisfied in at least one world of the resulting model).
The delicate point in removing worlds is that this may have as conse-
quence the loss of some executability laws: in the example, if there were
some arrow pointing from some world w to say {¬t,¬c, h}, then removing
the latter from the model would make the action under concern no longer
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executable in w, if it was the only arrow labeled by that action leaving it.
From a semantic point of view, this is intuitive: if the state of the world to
which we could move is no longer possible, then we do not have a transition
to that state anymore. Hence, if that transition was the only one we had, it
is natural to lose it.
Similarly, one could ask what to do with the accessibility relation if
new worlds are added, i.e., when expansion is not possible. Following the
discussion in Section 3.3, we here prefer not to systematically add new arrows
to the accessibility relation, and postpone correction of executability laws,
if needed. This approach is debatable, but with the information we have at
hand, this is the safest way of changing static laws.
The semantics for revision of one model by a static law is as follows:
Definition 7.1 Let M = 〈W,R〉. M ′ = 〈W′,R′〉 ∈ M ⋆ϕ if and only if:
• W′ = (W \ val(¬ϕ)) ∪ val(ϕ)
• R′ ⊆ R
Clearly |=
M ′
ϕ for each M ′ ∈ M ⋆ϕ . The minimal models resulting from
revising a model M by ϕ are those closest to M w.r.t. M :
Definition 7.2 Let M be a model and ϕ a static law. revise(M , ϕ) =⋃
min{M ⋆ϕ ,M }.
In the example of model M in Figure 12, revise(M ,¬coffee → ¬hot) is
the singleton {M ′}, where M ′ is as shown in Figure 13.
M ′ :
t, c, h
¬t, c, h
¬t,¬c,¬h t,¬c,¬h
b
b
b
b
Figure 13: Model resulting from revising the model M in Figure 12 with
¬coffee→ ¬hot.
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7.2 Revising a Model by an Effect Law
Let’s suppose now that our agent eventually discovers that after buying
coffee she does not keep her token. This means that her theory should now be
revised by the new effect law token→ [buy]¬token. Looking at model M in
Figure 12, this amounts to guaranteeing that the formula token∧〈buy〉token
is satisfiable in none of its worlds. To do that, we have to look at all the
worlds satisfying this formula (if any) and
• either make token false in each of these worlds,
• or make 〈buy〉token false in all of them.
If we chose the first option, we will essentially flip the truth value of
literal token in the respective worlds, which changes the set of valuations
of the model. If we chose the latter, we will basically remove buy-arrows
leading to token-worlds. In that case, a change in the accessibility relation
will be made.
In our example, we have that the possible worlds {token, coffee, hot},
{token,¬coffee, hot} and {token,¬coffee,¬hot} satisfy token∧〈buy〉token and
all they have to change.
Flipping token in all these worlds to ¬token would do the job, but would
also have as consequence the introduction of a new static law: ¬token would
now be valid, i.e., the agent never has a token.
Here we think that changing action laws should not have as side effect
a change in the static laws. Given their special status, these should change
only if explicitly required (see above). In this case, each world satisfying
token∧〈buy〉token has to be changed so that 〈buy〉token is no longer true in it.
In our example, we should remove the arrows ({token, coffee, hot}, {token, coffee, hot}),
({token,¬coffee, hot}, {token, coffee, hot}) and ({token,¬coffee,¬hot}, {token, coffee, hot}).
The semantics of one model revision for the case of a new effect law is:
Definition 7.3 Let M = 〈W,R〉. M ′ = 〈W′,R′〉 ∈ M ⋆
ϕ→[a]ψ if and only if:
• W′ = W
• R′ ⊆ R
• If (w,w′) ∈ R \ R′, then |=
M
w
ϕ
• |=
M ′
ϕ→ [a]ψ
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The minimal models resulting from the revision of a model M by a new
effect law are those that are closest to M w.r.t. M :
Definition 7.4 Let M be a model and ϕ→ [a]ψ an effect law. revise(M , ϕ→
[a]ψ) =
⋃
min{M ⋆
ϕ→[a]ψ,M }.
Taking again M as in Figure 12, revise(M , token → [buy]¬token) will
be the singleton {M ′} (Figure 14).
M ′ :
t, c, h
¬t, c, h
t,¬c, h
¬t,¬c,¬h ¬t,¬c, ht,¬c,¬h
b b
b
Figure 14: Model resulting from revising the model M in Figure 12 with
the new effect law token→ [buy]¬token.
7.3 Revising a Model by an Executability Law
Let us now suppose that in some stage it has been decided to grant free
coffee to everybody. Faced with this information, the agent will now revise
her laws to reflect the fact that buy can also be executed in ¬token-contexts:
¬token→ 〈buy〉⊤ is a new executability law (and hence we will have 〈buy〉⊤
in all new models of the agent’s beliefs).
Considering again the model in Figure 12, we observe that ¬(¬token→
〈buy〉⊤) is satisfiable in M . Hence we must throw ¬token ∧ [buy]⊥ away to
ensure the new formula becomes true.
To remove ¬token ∧ [buy]⊥ we have to look at all worlds satisfying it
and modify M so that they no longer satisfy that formula. Given worlds
{¬token,¬coffee,¬hot} and {¬token,¬coffee, hot}, we have two options: change
the interpretation of token or add new arrows leaving these worlds. A ques-
tion that arises is ‘what choice is more drastic: change a world or an ar-
row’? Again, here we think that changing the world’s content (the valua-
tion) is more drastic, as the existence of such a world was foreseen by some
static law and is hence assumed to be as it is, unless we have enough in-
formation supporting the contrary, in which case we explicitly change the
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static laws (see above). Thus we shall add a new buy-arrow from each of
{¬token,¬coffee,¬hot} and {¬token,¬coffee, hot}.
Having agreed on that, the issue now is: which worlds should the new
arrows point to? Recalling the reasoning developed in Section 3.2, in order to
comply with minimal change, the new arrows shall point to worlds that are
relevant targets of each of the ¬token-worlds in question. In our example,
{¬token, coffee, hot} is the only relevant target world here: the two other
¬token-worlds violate the effect coffee of buy, while the three token-worlds
would make us violate the frame axiom ¬token→ [buy]¬token.
The semantics for one model revision by a new executability law is as
follows:
Definition 7.5 Let M = 〈W,R〉. M ′ = 〈W′,R′〉 ∈ M ⋆
ϕ→〈a〉⊤ if and only
if:
• W′ = W
• R ⊆ R′
• If (w,w′) ∈ R′\R, then w′ ∈ RelTarget(w,ϕ→ [a]⊥,M ,M)
• |=
M ′
ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤
The minimal models resulting from revising a model M by a new exe-
cutability law are those closest to M w.r.t. M :
Definition 7.6 Let M be a model and ϕ → 〈a〉⊤ be an executability law.
revise(M , ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤) =
⋃
min{M ⋆
ϕ→〈a〉⊤,M }.
In our running example, revise(M ,¬token → 〈buy〉⊤) is the singleton
{M ′}, where M ′ is as shown in Figure 15.
7.4 Revising Sets of Models
Up until now we have seen what the revision of single models means. This is
needed when expansion by the new law is not possible due to inconsistency.
We here give a unified definition of revision of a set of models M by a new
law Φ:
Definition 7.7 Let M be a set of models and Φ a law. Then
M⋆Φ =
{
M\ {M :6|=
M
Φ}, if there is M ∈ M s.t. |=
M
Φ⋃
M∈M revise(M , Φ), otherwise
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M ′ :
t, c, h
¬t, c, h
t,¬c, h
¬t,¬c,¬h ¬t,¬c, ht,¬c,¬h
b b
b
b
b
b
b b
b
Figure 15: The result of revising model M in Figure 12 by the new exe-
cutability law ¬token→ 〈buy〉⊤.
Observe that Definition 7.7 comprises both expansion and revision: in the
first one, simple addition of the new law gives a satisfiable theory; in the
latter a deeper change is needed to get rid of inconsistency.
8 Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, the first work on updating an action domain
description is that by Li and Pereira [33] in a narrative-based action de-
scription language [16]. Contrary to us, however, they mainly investigate
the problem of updating the narrative with new observed facts and (possi-
bly) with occurrences of actions that explain those facts. This amounts to
updating a given state/configuration of the world (in our terms, what is true
in a possible world) and focusing on the models of the narrative in which
some actions took place (in our terms, the models of the action theory with
a particular sequence of action executions). Clearly the models of the action
laws remain the same.
Baral and Lobo [4] introduce extensions of action languages that allow
for some causal laws to be stated as defeasible. Their work is similar to
ours in that they also allow for weakening of laws: in their setting, effect
propositions can be replaced by what they call defeasible (weakened versions
of) effect propositions. Our approach is different from theirs in the way
executability laws are dealt with. Here executability laws are explicit and
we are also able to contract them. This feature is important when the
qualification problem [37] is considered: we may always discover contexts
that preclude the execution of a given action (cf. the Introduction).
Liberatore [34] proposes a framework for reasoning about actions in
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which it is possible to express a given semantics of belief update, like Winslett’s [55]
and Katsuno and Mendelzon’s [31]. This means it is the formalism, essen-
tially an action description language, that is used to describe updates (the
change of propositions from one state of the world to another) by expressing
them as laws in the action theory.
The main difference between Liberatore’s work and Li and Pereira’s is
that, despite not being concerned, at least a priori, with changing action
laws, Liberatore’s framework allows for abductively introducing in the action
theory new effect propositions (effect laws, in our terms) that consistently
explain the occurrence of an event.
The work by Eiter et al. [12, 13] is similar to ours in that they also
propose a framework that is oriented to updating action laws. They mainly
investigate the case where e.g. a new effect law is added to the description
(and then has to be true in all models of the modified theory). This problem
is the dual of contraction and is then closer to our definition of revision (cf.
Section 7).
In Eiter et al.’s framework, action theories are described in a variant
of a narrative-based action description language. Like in the present work,
the semantics is also in terms of transition systems: directed graphs hav-
ing arrows (action occurrences) linking nodes (configurations of the world).
Contrary to us, however, the minimality condition on the outcome of the
update is in terms of inclusion of sets of laws, which means the approach is
more syntax oriented.
In their setting, during an update an action theory T is seen as composed
of two pieces, Tu and Tm, where Tu stands for the part of T that is not
supposed to change and Tm contains the laws that may be modified. In our
terms, when contracting a static law we would have Tm = S ∪ Xa, when
contracting an executability Tm = Xa, and when contracting effects laws
Tm = E
−
a . The difference here is that in our approach it is always clear what
laws should not change in a given type of contraction, and Tu and Tm do
not need to be explicitly specified prior to the update.
Their approach and ours can both be described as constraint-based up-
date, in that the theory change is carried out relative to some restrictions
(a set of laws that we want to hold in the result). In our framework, for
example, all changes in the action laws are relative to the set of static laws
S (and that is why we concentrate on models of T having val(S ) as worlds).
When changing a law, we want to keep the same set of states. The differ-
ence w.r.t. Eiter et al.’s approach is that there it is also possible to update
a theory relatively to e.g. executability laws: when expanding T with a new
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effect law, one may want to constrain the change so that the action under
concern is guaranteed to be executable in the result.11 As shown in the
referred work, this may require the withdrawal of some static law. Hence, in
Eiter et al.’s framework, static laws do not have the same status as in ours.
Herzig et al. [21] define a method for action theory contraction that,
despite the similarity with the current work and the common underlying
motivations, is more limited than the present constructions.
First, with the referred approach we do not get minimal change. For
example, in the referred work the operator for contracting executability
laws is such that in the resulting theory the modified set of executabilities
is given by
X−a = {(ϕi ∧ ¬ϕ)→ 〈a〉⊤ : ϕi → 〈a〉⊤ ∈ Xa}
which, according to its semantics, gives theories among whose models are
those resulting from removing arrows from all ϕ-worlds. A similar comment
can be made w.r.t. contraction of effect laws.
Second, Herzig et al.’s contraction method does not satisfy most of the
postulates for theory change that we have addressed in Section 6. Besides
not satisfying the monotonicity postulate, it does not satisfy the preservation
one. To witness, suppose we have a language with only one atom p, and the
model M depicted in Figure 16.
M :
p ¬p
a
a
a
M ′ :
p ¬p
a
a
aa
Figure 16: Counter-example to preservation in the method of contraction
by Herzig et al. [21].
Then |=
M
p→ [a]¬p and 6|=
M
[a]¬p. Now the contraction operator defined
there is such that when removing [a]¬p from M yields the model M ′ in
Figure 16 such that R′a = W ×W. Then 6|=
M ′
p → [a]¬p, i.e., the effect law
p→ [a]¬p is not preserved.
11We could simulate that in our approach with two successive modifications of T: first
adding the effect law and then an executability law (cf. Section 7).
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9 Comments
In this section we make some comments about possible modifications or
improvements in our constructions so far.
9.1 Other Distance Notions
Here we have used a model distance based on symmetric differences between
sets. This distance is quite close to Winslett’s [55] notion of closeness be-
tween interpretations in the Possible Models Approach (PMA). Instead of
it, however, we could have considered other distance notions as well, like
e.g. Dalal’s [9] distance, Hamming distance [18], or weighted distance. Due
to space limitations, we do not develop a through comparison among all
these distances here. We nevertheless do show that with a cardinality-based
distance, for example, we may not always get the intended result.
Let card(X) denote the number of elements in set X. Then suppose our
closeness between PDL-models was defined as follows:
Definition 9.1 (Cardinality-based closeness between PDL-Models)
Let M = 〈W,R〉 be a model. Then M ′ = 〈W′,R′〉 is at least as close to M
as M ′′ = 〈W′′,R′′〉, noted M ′ ≤M M
′′, if and only if
• either card(W−˙W′) ≤ card(W−˙W′′)
• or card(W−˙W′) = card(W−˙W′′) and card(R−˙R′) ≤ card(R−˙R′′)
Such a notion of distance is closely related to Dalal’s [9] closeness.
Since when contracting a static law ϕ from a model M we usually add
one new possible world, it is easy to see that with this cardinality-based
distance we get the same result in contract(M , ϕ) as with the distance from
Definition 2.10.
When it comes to contraction of action laws, and then changing the ac-
cessibility relations, however, this cardinality-based distance does not seem
to fit with the intuitions. To witness, consider the model M in Figure 17,
which satisfies the executability law p1 → 〈a〉⊤.
Then, M−
p1→〈a〉⊤
= {M ′,M ′′}, where M ′ and M ′′ are as depicted in
Figure 18.
Note that M ′′ is an intended contracted model. However, with the
cardinality-based distance above we will get {M }−p1→〈a〉⊤ = {{M ,M
′}}.
We do not have {M ,M ′′} in the result since M ′ ≤M M
′′: in M ′ only one
arrow has been removed, while in M ′′ two.
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M :
p1, p2 p1,¬p2
¬p1,¬p2
a
a
a
Figure 17: A model M satisfying p1 → 〈a〉⊤.
M ′ :
p1, p2 p1,¬p2
¬p1,¬p2
a
a
M ′′ :
p1, p2 p1,¬p2
¬p1,¬p2
a
Figure 18: Models resulting from contracting p1 → 〈a〉⊤ in the model M of
Figure 17.
9.2 Inducing Executability
Regarding the semantics for contracting static laws, we could try to go
further and at least make a guess about what executability laws we should
preserve. Before doing that, we need a definition.
Definition 9.2 (Closeness between Valuations) Let v be a propositional
valuation. The valuation v′ is as close to v as v′′, noted v′ v v
′′, if and only
if v−˙v′ ⊆ v−˙v′′.
So the distance between valuations v1 and v2 is the set of literals on which
they differ: v1−˙v2 = {ℓ : v1  ℓ and v2 6 ℓ} ∪ {ℓ : v2  ℓ and v1 6 ℓ}.
Our argument now is as follows: when adding a new world, we can look
at its contents and see what happens in worlds that are similar to it (by
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similar here we mean the possible worlds that are closest to it). A priori
and intuitively we can expect that if we put a new arrow leaving the new
world, it will neither point to a world that is the target of no other world,
nor point to a world that is not closest to it. It is reasonable to expect that
in the new world a given action may have a behavior that is quite similar to
that which it has in the worlds that are closest to the new one. Hence we
select the worlds whose distance to the new one is minimal, look at where
the arrows leaving them point to, and then point the new arrow there. With
a similar argument, we can decide which arrows targeting the new world add
to the model. The definition below formalizes this.
Definition 9.3 Let M = 〈W,R〉. M ′ = 〈W′,R′〉 ∈ M−ϕ if and only if
• W ⊆W′
• R ⊆ R′
• If w′ ∈ W′ \ W, then R′(w′) ⊆ R(w) and R′−1(w′) ⊆ R−1(w),
where w ∈
⋃
min{W,w′}
• There is w ∈W′ s.t. 6|=
M ′
w
ϕ
With this new definition, what we do is suppose that some of the known
laws for the other worlds can still be true in the new state, by analogy to
the other possible states. In a similar way, when facing a new situation, we
may wonder how we got there. Again, by analogy with known states, we
could expect that we get to the new state coming from a state that usually
produces something similar to what we have now in front of us. In this case
we have a kind of abduction-like reasoning that may of course be wrong but
that is not illegal.
Although intuitive, at least in its motivation, adopting Definition 9.3
could have some undesirable side effects. For example, if in the semantics
we decide to add new arrows pointing from and to the new added world,
then our corresponding operator may not satisfy the monotonicity postulate.
To see, let
T =
{
p1 ⊗ p2, p1 → [a]p2,
p1 → 〈a〉⊤, p2 → [a]⊥
}
The only model of T is M = 〈W,R〉 such thatW = {{p1,¬p2}, {¬p1, p2}}
and R = {({p1,¬p2}, {¬p1, p2})} (Figure 19).
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M : p1,¬p2 ¬p1, p2
a
M ′ :
p1,¬p2 ¬p1, p2
p1, p2
a
a a
Figure 19: Counter-example to monotonicity when adding arrows to/from
new worlds in the semantics of static law contraction. M denotes the orig-
inal model of T, while M ′ shows the new added world and the candidate
arrows to add to Ra.
If we contract p1 → ¬p2 from T, in the semantic result we have only the
model M ′ in Figure 19 such that |=
M ′
p1 → 〈a〉〈a〉p2. Then, we would have
T ′ |=
PDL
p1 → 〈a〉〈a〉p2, and then T 6|=PDLT
′.
The very issue with such a semantic characterization however would be
how to capture it at the syntactic level: what syntax operator for change
should we have in order to capture this closeness between possible worlds?
More importantly, since we may be wrong about a guess regarding the exe-
cutability or an effect of a given action, how can it be rolled back in the new
theory? These are open questions that we leave for further investigation.
10 Concluding Remarks
In this work we have given a semantics for action theory change in terms of
distances between models that captures the notion of minimal change. We
have given algorithms to contract a formula from a theory that terminate
and are correct w.r.t. the semantics (Corollary 5.1). We have shown the
importance that modularity has in this result and in others.
Under modularity, our operators satisfy all the postulates for contraction.
This supports the thesis that our modularity notion is fruitful.
By forcing formulas to be explicitly stated in their respective modules
(and thus possibly making them inferable in independently different ways),
modularity intuitively could be seen to diminish elaboration tolerance [38].
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For instance, when contracting a Boolean formula ϕ in a non-modular the-
ory, it seems reasonable to expect not to change the set of static laws S ,
while the theory being modular surely forces changing such a module.
It is not difficult, however, to conceive non-modular theories in which
contraction of a formula ϕ may demand a change in S as well. As an
example, suppose S = {ϕ1 → ϕ2} in an action theory from whose dynamic
part we (implicitly) infer ¬ϕ2. In this case, contracting ¬ϕ1 while keeping
¬ϕ2 would necessarily ask for a change in S .
We point out nevertheless that in both cases (modular and non-modular)
the extra work in changing other modules stays in the mechanical level, i.e.,
in the algorithms that carry out the modification, and does not augment in a
significant way the amount of work the knowledge engineer is expected to do.
Moreover, considering the evolution of the theory, i.e., future modifications
one should perform in it, modularity has to be checked/ensured only once,
since it is preserved by our operators (cf. Lemma B.1).
While terminating, our algorithms come with a considerable computa-
tional cost: the entailment test in Kn with global axioms is known to be
pspace-complete. Although this may be acceptable (theory change can be
carried out offline), the computation of IP(.) might result in exponential
growth.
We have also extended Varzinczak’s studies [52] by defining a semantics
for action theory revision based on minimal modifications of models. For
the corresponding revision algorithms, the reader is referred to the work by
Varzinczak [53]. One of our ongoing researches is on assessing our revision
operators’ behavior w.r.t. the AGM postulates for revision [1].
Another issue that drives our future research on the subject is how to
contract not only laws but any PDL-formula. As defined, the order of appli-
cation of our operators matter in the final result: if we contract ϕ and then
ϕ → [a]ψ from a theory T, the result may not be the same as contracting
ϕ → [a]ψ first and then removing ϕ. This problem would not appear in a
more general framework in which any formula could be contracted: removing
ϕ ∧ (ϕ→ [a]ψ) should give the same result as (ϕ→ [a]ψ) ∧ ϕ.
Definitions 3.1, 3.5 and 3.8 appear to be important for better under-
standing the problem of contracting general formulas: basically the set of
modifications to perform in a given model in order to force it to falsify a
general formula will comprise removal/addition of arrows/worlds. The def-
inition of a general revision/contraction method will then benefit from our
constructions.
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Given the connection between multimodal logics and Description Log-
ics [3], we believe that the definitions here given may also contribute to
ontology evolution and debugging in DLs.
Acknowledgements
The author is grateful to Arina Britz and Ken Halland for proofreading an
earlier version of this article. Their comments helped very much in improv-
ing the text.
References
[1] C. Alchourro´n, P. Ga¨rdenfors, and D. Makinson. On the logic of theory
change: Partial meet contraction and revision functions. J. of Symbolic
Logic, 50:510–530, 1985.
[2] E. Amir. (De)composition of situation calculus theories. In Proc.
17th Natl. Conf. on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI’2000), pages 456–463,
Austin, 2000. AAAI Press/MIT Press.
[3] F. Baader, D. Calvanese, D. McGuinness, D. Nardi, and P. Patel-
Schneider, editors. Description Logic Handbook. Cambridge University
Press, 2003.
[4] C. Baral and J. Lobo. Defeasible specifications in action theories. In
M.E. Pollack, editor, Proc. 15th Intl. Joint Conf. on Artificial Intelli-
gence (IJCAI’97), pages 1441–1446, Nagoya, 1997. Morgan Kaufmann
Publishers.
[5] G. Brewka, S. Coradeschi, A. Perini, and P. Traverso, editors. Proc.
17th Eur. Conf. on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI’06), Riva del Garda,
2006. IOS Press.
[6] M. Castilho, O. Gasquet, and A. Herzig. Formalizing action and change
in modal logic I: the frame problem. J. of Logic and Computation,
9(5):701–735, 1999.
[7] L. Cholvy. Checking regulation consistency by using SOL-resolution.
In Proc. 7th Intl. Conf. on AI and Law, pages 73–79, Oslo, 1999.
51
[8] B. Cuenca Grau, B. Parsia, E. Sirin, and A. Kalyanpur. Modularity
and web ontologies. In P. Doherty, J. Mylopoulos, and C. Welty, edi-
tors, Proc. 10th Intl. Conf. on Knowledge Representation and Reason-
ing (KR’2006), pages 198–208, Lake District, 2006. Morgan Kaufmann
Publishers.
[9] M. Dalal. Investigations into a theory of knowledge base revision: pre-
liminary report. In Smith and Mitchell [48], pages 475–479.
[10] G. De Giacomo and M. Lenzerini. PDL-based framework for reasoning
about actions. In M. Gori and G. Soda, editors, Proc. 4th Congresss of
the Italian Association for Artificial Intelligence (IA*AI’95), number
992 in LNAI, pages 103–114. Springer-Verlag, 1995.
[11] R. Demolombe, A. Herzig, and I. Varzinczak. Regression in modal logic.
J. of Applied Non-Classical Logics (JANCL), 13(2):165–185, 2003.
[12] T. Eiter, E. Erdem, M. Fink, and J. Senko. Updating action domain
descriptions. In Kaelbling and Saffiotti [29], pages 418–423.
[13] T. Eiter, E. Erdem, M. Fink, and J. Senko. Resolving conflicts in action
descriptions. In Brewka et al. [5], pages 367–371.
[14] A. Fuhrmann. On the modal logic of theory change. In The Logic of
Theory Change, pages 259–281, 1989.
[15] P. Ga¨rdenfors. Knowledge in Flux: Modeling the Dynamics of Epistemic
States. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1988.
[16] M. Gelfond and V. Lifschitz. Representing action and change by logic
programs. Journal of Logic Programming, 17(2/3&4):301–321, 1993.
[17] E. Giunchiglia, G. Kartha, and V. Lifschitz. Representing action: in-
determinacy and ramifications. Artificial Intelligence, 95(2):409–438,
1997.
[18] R.W. Hamming. Error detecting and error correcting codes. Bell Sys-
tem Technical Journal, 26(2):147–160, 1950.
[19] S. Hansson. A Textbook of Belief Dynamics: Theory Change and
Database Updating. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999.
[20] D. Harel, J. Tiuryn, and D. Kozen. Dynamic Logic. MIT Press, Cam-
bridge, MA, 2000.
52
[21] A. Herzig, L. Perrussel, and I. Varzinczak. Elaborating domain descrip-
tions. In Brewka et al. [5], pages 397–401.
[22] A. Herzig and O. Rifi. Propositional belief base update and minimal
change. Artificial Intelligence, 115(1):107–138, 1999.
[23] A. Herzig and I. Varzinczak. Domain descriptions should be modular.
In R. Lo´pez de Ma´ntaras and L. Saitta, editors, Proc. 16th Eur. Conf.
on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI’04), pages 348–352, Valencia, 2004.
IOS Press.
[24] A. Herzig and I. Varzinczak. Cohesion, coupling and the meta-theory
of actions. In Kaelbling and Saffiotti [29], pages 442–447.
[25] A. Herzig and I. Varzinczak. On the modularity of theories. In
R. Schmidt, I. Pratt-Hartmann, M. Reynolds, and H. Wansing, edi-
tors, Advances in Modal Logic, volume 5, pages 93–109. King’s College
Publications, 2005. Selected papers of AiML 2004 (also available at
http://www.aiml.net/volumes/volume5).
[26] A. Herzig and I. Varzinczak. A modularity approach for a fragment of
ALC. In M. Fisher, W. van der Hoek, B. Konev, and A. Lisitsa, editors,
Proc. 10th Eur. Conf. on Logics in Artificial Intelligence (JELIA’2006),
number 4160 in LNAI, pages 216–228. Springer-Verlag, 2006.
[27] A. Herzig and I. Varzinczak. Metatheory of actions: beyond consistency.
Artificial Intelligence, 171:951–984, 2007.
[28] Y. Jin and M. Thielscher. Iterated belief revision, revised. In Kaelbling
and Saffiotti [29], pages 478–483.
[29] L. Kaelbling and A. Saffiotti, editors. Proc. 19th Intl. Joint Conf. on
Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI’05), Edinburgh, 2005. Morgan Kaufmann
Publishers.
[30] N. Kartha and V. Lifschitz. Actions with indirect effects (preliminary
report). In J. Doyle, E. Sandewall, and P. Torasso, editors, Proc. 4th
Intl. Conf. on Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR’94), pages
341–350, Bonn, 1994. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers.
[31] H. Katsuno and A. Mendelzon. On the difference between updating a
knowledge base and revising it. In P. Ga¨rdenfors, editor, Belief revision,
pages 183–203. Cambridge University Press, 1992.
53
[32] M. Kracht and F. Wolter. Properties of independently axiomatizable
bimodal logics. J. of Symbolic Logic, 56(4):1469–1485, 1991.
[33] R. Li and L.M. Pereira. What is believed is what is explained. In
H. Shrobe and T. Senator, editors, Proc. 13th Natl. Conf. on Arti-
ficial Intelligence (AAAI’96), pages 550–555, Portland, 1996. AAAI
Press/MIT Press.
[34] P. Liberatore. A framework for belief update. In Proc. 7th Eur. Conf.
on Logics in Artificial Intelligence (JELIA’2000), pages 361–375, 2000.
[35] D. Makinson. Friendliness and sympathy in logic. In J.-Y. Beziau,
editor, Logica Universalis. Springer-Verlag, 2nd edition, 2007.
[36] P. Marquis. Consequence finding algorithms. In D. Gabbay and Ph.
Smets, editors, Algorithms for Defeasible and Uncertain Reasoning, in
S. Moral, J. Kohlas (Eds), Handbook of Defeasible Reasoning and Un-
certainty Management Systems, volume 5, chapter 2, pages 41–145.
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000.
[37] J. McCarthy. Epistemological problems of artificial intelligence. In
N. Sridharan, editor, Proc. 5th Intl. Joint Conf. on Artificial Intel-
ligence (IJCAI’77), pages 1038–1044, Cambridge, MA, 1977. Morgan
Kaufmann Publishers.
[38] J. McCarthy. Elaboration tolerance. In Proc.
Common Sense’98, London, 1998. Available at
http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/elaboration.html.
[39] J. McCarthy and P. Hayes. Some philosophical problems from the
standpoint of artificial intelligence. In B. Meltzer and D. Mitchie, ed-
itors, Machine Intelligence, volume 4, pages 463–502. Edinburgh Uni-
versity Press, 1969.
[40] B. Nebel. A knowledge level analysis of belief revision. In R. Brachman,
H. Levesque, and R. Reiter, editors, Proc. Intl. Conf. on Knowledge
Representation and Reasoning (KR’89), pages 301–311, Toronto, 1989.
Morgan Kaufmann Publishers.
[41] R. Parikh. Beliefs, belief revision, and splitting languages. In L. Moss,
editor, Logic, Language and Computation, volume 2 of CSLI Lecture
Notes, pages 266–278. CSLI Publications, 1999.
54
[42] S. Popkorn. First Steps in Modal Logic. Cambridge University Press,
1994.
[43] W. V. O. Quine. The problem of simplifying truth functions. American
Mathematical Monthly, 59:521–531, 1952.
[44] W. V. O. Quine. Paradox. Scientific American, pages 84–96, 1962.
[45] R. Reiter. The frame problem in the situation calculus: A simple so-
lution (sometimes) and a completeness result for goal regression. In
V. Lifschitz, editor, Artificial Intelligence and Mathematical Theory of
Computation: Papers in Honor of John McCarthy, pages 359–380. Aca-
demic Press, San Diego, 1991.
[46] S. Shapiro, Y. Lespe´rance, and H. Levesque. Goal change. In Kaelbling
and Saffiotti [29], pages 582–588.
[47] S. Shapiro, M. Pagnucco, Y. Lespe´rance, and H. Levesque. Iterated
belief change in the situation calculus. In T. Cohn, F. Giunchiglia, and
B. Selman, editors, Proc. 7th Intl. Conf. on Knowledge Representation
and Reasoning (KR’2000), pages 527–538, Breckenridge, 2000. Morgan
Kaufmann Publishers.
[48] R. Smith and T. Mitchell, editors. Proc. 7th Natl. Conf. on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI’88), St. Paul, 1988. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers.
[49] M. Thielscher. Computing ramifications by postprocessing. In C. Mel-
lish, editor, Proc. 14th Intl. Joint Conf. on Artificial Intelligence (IJ-
CAI’95), pages 1994–2000, Montreal, 1995. Morgan Kaufmann Pub-
lishers.
[50] M. Thielscher. Ramification and causality. Artificial Intelligence, 89(1–
2):317–364, 1997.
[51] I. Varzinczak. What is a good domain description? Evaluating and
revising action theories in dynamic logic. PhD thesis, Universite´ Paul
Sabatier, Toulouse, 2006.
[52] I. Varzinczak. Action theory contraction and minimal change. In
G. Brewka and J. Lang, editors, Proc. 11th Intl. Conf. on Knowl-
edge Representation and Reasoning (KR’2008), pages 651–661, Sydney,
2008. AAAI Press/MIT Press.
55
[53] I. Varzinczak. Action theory revision in dynamic logic. In Workshop
on Nonmonotonic Reasoning (NMR’08), Sydney, 2008.
[54] F. Veltman. Making counterfactual assumptions. Journal of Semantics,
22(2):159–180, 2005.
[55] M.-A. Winslett. Reasoning about action using a possible models ap-
proach. In Smith and Mitchell [48], pages 89–93.
[56] D. Zhang, S. Chopra, and N. Foo. Consistency of action descriptions.
In M. Ishizuka and A. Sattar, editors, Proc. 7th Pacific Rim Intl. Conf.
on Artificial Intelligence: Trends in Artificial Intelligence, number 2417
in LNCS, pages 70–79. Springer-Verlag, 2002.
[57] D. Zhang and N. Foo. EPDL: A logic for causal reasoning. In
B. Nebel, editor, Proc. 17th Intl. Joint Conf. on Artificial Intelligence
(IJCAI’01), pages 131–138, Seattle, 2001. Morgan Kaufmann Publish-
ers.
A Proof of Theorem 5.2
Let T be modular, and Φ be a law. For all M′ ∈ M−Φ such that |=
M
T for
every M ∈ M, there is T ′ ∈ T−Φ such that |=
M ′
T ′ for every M ′ ∈ M′.
Lemma A.1 T |=
PDL
T ′.
Proof: Let T be an action theory, and T ′ ∈ T−Φ , for Φ a law. We analyze
each case.
Let Φ be of the form ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤, for some ϕ ∈ Fml. Then T ′ is such that
T ′ = (T \ Xa) ∪ {(ϕi ∧ ¬(π ∧ ϕA))→ 〈a〉⊤ : ϕi → 〈a〉⊤ ∈ Xa}
where π ∈ IP(S ∧ ϕ) and ϕA =
∧
pi∈atm(pi)
pi∈A
pi ∧
∧
pi∈atm(pi)
pi /∈A
¬pi, for some A ⊆
atm(π).
Let M = 〈W,R〉 be such that |=
M
T. It is enough to show that M is a
model of the new laws. For every (ϕi∧¬(π∧ϕA))→ 〈a〉⊤, for every w ∈W,
if |=
M
w
ϕi ∧ ¬(π ∧ ϕA), then |=
M
w
ϕi. Because T |=
PDL
ϕi → 〈a〉⊤, |=
M
ϕi → 〈a〉⊤,
and then Ra(w) 6= ∅.
Hence |=
M
T ′.
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Let now Φ have the form ϕ→ [a]ψ, for ϕ,ψ ∈ Fml. Then T ′ is such that
T ′ =
(T \ E−a ) ∪
{(ϕi ∧ ¬(π ∧ ϕA))→ [a]ψi : ϕi → [a]ψi ∈ E
−
a } ∪
{(ϕi ∧ π ∧ ϕA)→ [a](ψi ∨ π
′) : ϕi → [a]ψi ∈ E
−
a } ∪

ℓ ∈ L, for some L ⊆ Lit s.t.
(π ∧ ϕA ∧ ℓ)→ [a](ψ ∨ ℓ) : S 6⊢ (π
′ ∧
∧
ℓ∈L ℓ)→ ⊥, and ℓ ∈ π
′
or T 6⊢
PDL
(π ∧ ϕA ∧ ℓ)→ [a]¬ℓ


where E−a =
⋃
1≤i≤n(E
ϕ,ψ
a )i, π ∈ IP(S ∧ ϕ), ϕA =
∧
pi∈atm(pi)
pi∈A
pi∧
∧
pi∈atm(pi)
pi /∈A
¬pi,
for some A ⊆ atm(π), and π′ ∈ IP(S ∧ ¬ψ).
Let M = 〈W,R〉 be such that |=
M
T. It is enough to show that M is a
model of the added laws. Given (ϕi ∧¬(π ∧ϕA))→ [a]ψi, for every w ∈W,
if |=
M
w
ϕi ∧ ¬(π ∧ ϕA), then |=
M
w
ϕi. Because T |=
PDL
ϕi → [a]ψi, |=
M
ϕi → [a]ψi,
and then |=
M
w′
ψi for every w
′ ∈W such that (w,w′) ∈ Ra.
For (ϕi ∧π∧ϕA)→ [a](ψi ∨π
′), for every w ∈W, if |=
M
w
ϕi∧π∧ϕA, then
again |=
M
w′
ψi for every w
′ ∈W such that (w,w′) ∈ Ra.
Now, given (π ∧ ϕA ∧ ℓ)→ [a](ψ ∨ ℓ), for every w ∈W, if |=
M
w
π ∧ ϕA ∧ ℓ,
then |=
M
w
π, and then |=
M
w
ϕ. Since T |=
PDL
ϕ→ [a]ψ, we have |=
M
ϕ→ [a]ψ, and
then |=
M
w′
ψ for every w′ ∈W such that (w,w′) ∈ Ra.
Hence |=
M
T ′.
Let Φ be a propositional ϕ. Then T ′ is such that
T ′ =
((T \ S ) ∪ S−) \ Xa ∪
{(ϕi ∧ ϕ)→ 〈a〉⊤ : ϕi → 〈a〉⊤ ∈ Xa} ∪
{¬ϕ→ [a]⊥}
for some S− ∈ S ⊖ ϕ.
Let M = 〈W,R〉 be such that |=
M
T. It suffices to show that M satisfies
the added laws.
Since we assume ⊖ behaves like a classical contraction operator, like e.g.
Katsuno and Mendelzon’s [31], we have |=
CPL
S → S−, and then, because
|=
M
S , we have |=
M
S−.
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Now given (ϕi ∧ ϕ) → 〈a〉⊤, for every w ∈ W, if |=
M
w
ϕi ∧ ϕ, then |=
M
w
ϕi,
and because |=
M
ϕi → 〈a〉⊤, we have Ra(w) 6= ∅.
Finally, for ¬ϕ→ [a]⊥, because |=
M
ϕ, M trivially satisfies ¬ϕ→ [a]⊥.
Hence, |=
M
T ′.
Proof of Theorem 5.2
Let M = {M :|=
M
T}, and M′ ∈ M−Φ . We show that there is T
′ ∈ T−Φ
such that |=
M ′
T ′ for every M ′ ∈ M′.
By definition, each M ′ ∈ M′ is such that either |=
M ′
T or 6|=
M ′
Φ. Because
T−Φ 6= ∅, there must be T
′ ∈ T−Φ . If |=
M ′
T, by Lemma A.1 |=
M ′
T ′ and we are
done. Let’s then suppose that 6|=
M ′
Φ. We analyze each case.
Let Φ have the form ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤ for some ϕ ∈ Fml. Then M ′ = 〈W′,R′〉,
where W′ = W, R′ = R \ Rϕa , with R
ϕ
a = {(w,w
′) :|=
M
w
ϕ and (w,w′) ∈ Ra},
for some M ∈ M.
Let u ∈W′ be such that 6|=
M ′
u
ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤, i.e., |=
M ′
u
ϕ and R′a(u) = ∅.
Because u  ϕ, there must be v ∈ base(ϕ,W′) such that v ⊆ u. Let
π =
∧
ℓ∈v ℓ. Clearly π is a prime implicant of S ∧ϕ. Let also ϕA =
∧
ℓ∈u\v ℓ,
and consider
T ′ = (T \ Xa) ∪ {(ϕi ∧ ¬(π ∧ ϕA))→ 〈a〉⊤ : ϕi → 〈a〉⊤ ∈ Xa}
(Clearly, T ′ is a theory produced by Algorithm 1.)
It is enough to show that M ′ is a model of the new added laws. Given
(ϕi ∧¬(π ∧ϕA))→ 〈a〉⊤ ∈ T
′, for every w ∈W′, if |=
M ′
w
ϕi ∧¬(π ∧ϕA), then
|=
M ′
w
ϕi, from what it follows |=
M
w
ϕi. Because |=
M
ϕi → 〈a〉⊤, there is w
′ ∈ W
such that w′ ∈ Ra(w). We need to show that (w,w
′) ∈ R′a. If 6|=
M
w
ϕ, then
Rϕa = ∅, and (w,w
′) ∈ R′a. If |=
M
w
ϕ, either w = u, and then from |=
M ′
u
π ∧ ϕA
we conclude |=
M ′
u
(ϕi ∧ ¬(π ∧ ϕA))→ 〈a〉⊤, or w 6= u and then we must have
(w,w′) ∈ R′a, otherwise there is S
ϕ
a ⊂ R
ϕ
a such that R−˙(R\S
ϕ
a ) ⊂ R−˙(R\R
ϕ
a ),
and then M ′′ = 〈W′,R \ Sϕa 〉 is such that 6|=
M ′′
ϕ → 〈a〉⊤ and M ′′ M M
′,
a contradiction because M ′ is minimal w.r.t. M . Thus (w,w
′) ∈ R′a, and
then |=
M ′
w
〈a〉⊤. Hence |=
M ′
T ′.
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Now let Φ be of the form ϕ → [a]ψ, for ϕ,ψ both Boolean. Then
M ′ = 〈W′,R′〉, where W′ = W, R′ = R ∪ Rϕ,¬ψa , with
Rϕ,¬ψa = {(w,w
′) : w′ ∈ RelTarget(w,ϕ→ [a]ψ,M ,M)}
for some M = 〈W,R〉 ∈ M.
Let u ∈W′ be such that 6|=
M ′
u
ϕ→ [a]ψ. Then there is u′ ∈ W′ such that
(u, u′) ∈ R′a and 6|=
M ′
u′
ψ. Because u  ϕ, there is v ∈ base(ϕ,W′) such that
v ⊆ u, and as u′  ¬ψ, there must be v′ ∈ base(¬ψ,W′) such that v′ ⊆ u′.
Let π =
∧
ℓ∈v ℓ, ϕA =
∧
ℓ∈u\v ℓ, and π
′ =
∧
ℓ∈v′ ℓ. Clearly π (resp. π
′) is a
prime implicant of S ∧ ϕ (resp. S ∧ ¬ψ).
Now let E−a =
⋃
1≤i≤n(E
ϕ,ψ
a )i and let the theory
T ′ =
(T \ E−a ) ∪
{(ϕi ∧ ¬(π ∧ ϕA))→ [a]ψi : ϕi → [a]ψi ∈ E
−
a } ∪
{(ϕi ∧ π ∧ ϕA)→ [a](ψi ∨ π
′) : ϕi → [a]ψi ∈ E
−
a } ∪

ℓ ∈ L, for some L ⊆ Lit s.t.
(π ∧ ϕA ∧ ℓ)→ [a](ψ ∨ ℓ) : S 6⊢ (π
′ ∧
∧
ℓ∈L ℓ)→ ⊥, and ℓ ∈ π
′
or T 6⊢
PDL
(π ∧ ϕA ∧ ℓ)→ [a]¬ℓ


(Clearly, T ′ is a theory produced by Algorithm 2.)
In order to show that M ′ is a model of T ′, it is enough to show that
it is a model of the added laws. Given (ϕi ∧ ¬(π ∧ ϕA)) → [a]ψi ∈ T
′, for
every w ∈ W′, if |=
M ′
w
ϕi ∧ ¬(π ∧ ϕA), then |=
M ′
w
ϕi, and then |=
M
w
ϕi. Because
|=
M
ϕi → [a]ψi, |=
M
w′
ψi for all w
′ ∈W such that (w,w′) ∈ Ra. We need to show
that R′a(w) = Ra(w). If 6|=
M
w
ϕ, then Rϕ,¬ψa = ∅, and then R
′
a(w) = Ra(w). If
|=
M
w
ϕ, then either w = u, and from |=
M ′
u
π ∧ ϕA we conclude |=
M ′
u
(ϕi ∧ ¬(π ∧
ϕA))→ [a]ψi, or w 6= u, and then we must have R
ϕ,¬ψ
a = ∅, otherwise there
would be Sϕ,¬ψa ⊂ R
ϕ,¬ψ
a such that R−˙(R∪S
ϕ,¬ψ
a ) ⊂ R−˙(R∪R
ϕ,¬ψ
a ), and then
M ′′ = 〈W′,R ∪ Sϕ,¬ψa 〉 would be such that 6|=
M ′′
ϕ → [a]ψ and M ′′ M M
′,
a contradiction since M ′ is minimal w.r.t. M . Hence R
′
a(w) = Ra(w), and
|=
M ′
w′
ψi for all w
′ such that (w,w′) ∈ R′a.
Now, given (ϕi∧π∧ϕA)→ [a](ψi∨π
′), for every w ∈W′, if |=
M ′
w
ϕi∧π∧ϕA,
then |=
M ′
w
ϕi, and then |=
M
w
ϕi. Because, |=
M
ϕi → [a]ψi, we have |=
M
w′
ψi for all
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w′ ∈W such that (w,w′) ∈ Ra, and then |=
M ′
w′
ψi for every w
′ ∈W′ such that
(w,w′) ∈ R′a \ R
ϕ,¬ψ
a . Now, given (w,w
′) ∈ Rϕ,¬ψa , |=
M ′
w′
π′, and the result
follows.
Now, for each (π∧ϕA∧ℓ)→ [a](ψ∨ℓ), for every w ∈W
′, if |=
M ′
w
π∧ϕA∧ℓ,
then |=
M ′
w
ϕ, and then |=
M
w
ϕ. Because |=
M
ϕ → [a]ψ, we have |=
M
w′
ψ for every
w′ ∈ W such that (w,w′) ∈ Ra, and then |=
M ′
w′
ψ for all w′ ∈ W′ such that
(w,w′) ∈ R′a \ R
ϕ,¬ψ
a . It remains to show that |=
M ′
w′
ℓ for every w′ ∈ W′ such
that (w,w′) ∈ Rϕ,¬ψa . Since M
′ is minimal, it is enough to show that |=
M ′
u′
ℓ
for every ℓ ∈ Lit such that |=
M ′
u
π ∧ ϕA ∧ ℓ. If ℓ ∈ π
′, the result follows.
Otherwise, suppose 6|=
M ′
u′
ℓ. Then
• either ¬ℓ ∈ π′, then π′ and ℓ are unsatisfiable, and in this case Al-
gorithm 2 has not put the law (π ∧ ϕA ∧ ℓ) → [a](ψ ∨ ℓ) in T
′, a
contradiction;
• or ¬ℓ ∈ u′ \ v′. In this case, there is a valuation u′′ = (u′ \ {¬ℓ})∪ {ℓ}
such that u′′ 6 ψ. We must have u′′ ∈ W′, otherwise there will be
L′ = {ℓi : ℓi ∈ u
′′} such that T |=
PDL
(π′ ∧
∧
ℓi∈L′
ℓi)→ ⊥, and, because
T is modular, S |=
CPL
(π′ ∧
∧
ℓi∈L′
ℓi) → ⊥, and then Algorithm 2 has
not put the law (π ∧ϕA ∧ ℓ)→ [a](ψ ∨ ℓ) in T
′, a contradiction. Then
u′′ ∈ W′, and moreover u′′ /∈ Rϕ,¬ψa (u), otherwise M
′ is not minimal.
As u′′ \ u ⊂ u′ \ u, the only reason why u′′ /∈ Rϕ,¬ψa (u) is that there is
ℓ′ ∈ u ∩ u′′ such that |=
Mi∧
ℓj∈u
ℓj → [a]¬ℓ
′ for every Mi ∈ M if and
only if ℓ′ /∈ v′ for any v′ ∈ base(¬ψ,W ′) such that v′ ⊆ u′′. Clearly
ℓ′ = ℓ, and because ℓ /∈ π′, we have |=
Mi∧
ℓj∈u
ℓj → [a]¬ℓ for every
Mi ∈ M. Then T |=
PDL
(π ∧ϕA∧ ℓ)→ [a]¬ℓ, and then Algorithm 2 has
not put the law (π ∧ ϕA ∧ ℓ)→ [a](ψ ∨ ℓ) in T
′, a contradiction.
Hence we have |=
M ′
w′
ψ ∨ ℓ for every w′ ∈W′ such that (w,w′) ∈ R′a.
Putting the above results together, we get |=
M ′
T ′.
Let now Φ be some propositional ϕ. Then M ′ = 〈W′,R′〉, where W ⊆
W′, R′ = R, is minimal w.r.t. M , i.e., W
′ is a minimum superset of W such
that there is u ∈ W′ with u 6 ϕ. Because we have assumed the syntactical
classical contraction operator is sound and complete w.r.t. its semantics and
is moreover minimal, then there must be S− ∈ S⊖ϕ such thatW′ = val(S−).
Hence |=
M ′
S−.
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Because R′ = R, every effect law of T remains true in M ′.
Now, let
T ′ =
((T \ S ) ∪ S−) \ Xa ∪
{(ϕi ∧ ϕ)→ 〈a〉⊤ : ϕi → 〈a〉⊤ ∈ Xa} ∪
{¬ϕ→ [a]⊥}
(Clearly, T ′ is a theory produced by Algorithm 3.)
For every (ϕi ∧ ϕ) → 〈a〉⊤ ∈ T
′ and every w ∈ W′, if |=
M ′
w
ϕi ∧ ϕ, then
Ra(w) 6= ∅, because |=
M
w
ϕi → 〈a〉⊤. Given ¬ϕ → [a]⊥, for every w ∈ W
′, if
|=
M ′
w
¬ϕ, then w = u, and Ra(w) = ∅.
Putting all these results together, we have |=
M ′
T ′.
B Proof of Theorem 5.3
Let T be modular, Φ a law, and T ′ ∈ T−Φ . For all M
′ such that |=
M ′
T ′, there
is M′ ∈M−Φ such that M
′ ∈ M′ and |=
M
T for every M ∈ M.
Lemma B.1 Let Φ be a law. If T is modular, then every T ′ ∈ T−Φ is modu-
lar.
Proof: Let Φ be nonclassical, and suppose there is T ′ ∈ T−Φ such that T
′
is not modular. Then there is some ϕ′ ∈ Fml such that T ′ |=
PDL
ϕ′ and
S ′ 6|=
CPL
ϕ′, where S ′ is the set of static laws in T ′. By Lemma A.1, T |=
PDL
T ′,
and then we have T |=
PDL
ϕ′. Because Φ is nonclassical, S ′ = S . Thus
S 6|=
CPL
ϕ′, and hence T is not modular.
Let now Φ be some ϕ ∈ Fml. Then
T ′ =
((T \ S ) ∪ S−) \ Xa ∪
{(ϕi ∧ ϕ)→ 〈a〉⊤ : ϕi → 〈a〉⊤ ∈ Xa} ∪
{¬ϕ→ [a]⊥}
for some S− ∈ S ⊖ ϕ.
Suppose T is modular, and let ϕ′ ∈ Fml be such that T ′ |=
PDL
ϕ′ and
S− 6|=
CPL
ϕ′.
As S− 6|=
CPL
ϕ′, there is v ∈ val(S−) such that v 6 ϕ′. If v ∈ val(S ), then
S 6|=
CPL
ϕ′, and as T is modular, T 6|=
PDL
ϕ′. By Lemma A.1, T |=
PDL
T ′, and we
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have T ′ 6|=
PDL
ϕ′, a contradiction. Hence v /∈ val(S ). Moreover, we must have
v 6 ϕ, otherwise ⊖ has not worked as expected.
Let M = 〈W,R〉 be such that |=
M
T ′. (We extend M to another model
of T ′.) Let M ′ = 〈W′,R′〉 be such that W′ = W ∪ {v} and R′ = R. To
show that M ′ is a model of T ′, it suffices to show that v satisfies every law
in T ′. As v ∈ val(S−), |=
M ′
v
S−. Given ¬ϕ → [a]⊥ ∈ T ′, as v 6 ϕ and
R′a(v) = ∅, |=
M ′
v
¬ϕ → [a]⊥. Now, for every ϕi → [a]ψi ∈ T
′, if |=
M ′
v
ϕi, then
we trivially have |=
M ′
v′
ψi for every v
′ such that (v, v′) ∈ R′a. Finally, given
(ϕi ∧ ϕ) → 〈a〉⊤ ∈ T
′, as v 6 ϕ, the formula trivially holds in v. Hence
|=
M ′
T ′, and because there is v ∈ W′ such that 6|=
M ′
v
ϕ′, we have T ′ 6|=
PDL
ϕ′, a
contradiction. Hence for all ϕ′ ∈ Fml such that T ′ |=
PDL
ϕ′, S− |=
CPL
ϕ′, and
then T ′ is modular.
Lemma B.2 If Mbig = 〈Wbig,Rbig〉 is a model of T, then for every M =
〈W,R〉 such that |=
M
T there is a minimal (w.r.t. set inclusion) extension
R′ ⊆ Rbig \ R such that M
′ = 〈val(S ),R ∪ R′〉 is a model of T.
Proof: Let Mbig = 〈Wbig,Rbig〉 be a model of T, and let M = 〈W,R〉 be
such that |=
M
T. Consider M ′ = 〈val(S ),R〉. If |=
M ′
T, we have R′ = ∅ ⊆
Rbig \ R that is minimal. Suppose then 6|=
M ′
T. We extend M ′ to a model
of T that is a minimal extension of M . As 6|=
M ′
T, there is v ∈ val(S ) \W
such that 6|=
M ′
v
T. Then there is Φ ∈ T such that 6|=
M ′
v
Φ. If Φ is some ϕ ∈ Fml,
as v ∈ Wbig, Mbig is not a model of T. If Φ is of the form ϕ → [a]ψ,
for ϕ,ψ ∈ Fml, there is v′ ∈ val(S ) such that (v, v′) ∈ Ra and v
′ 6 ψ, a
contradiction since Ra(v) = ∅. Let now Φ have the form ϕ → 〈a〉⊤ for
some ϕ ∈ Fml. Then |=
M ′
v
ϕ. As v ∈ Wbig, if 6|=
Mbig
v
ϕ → 〈a〉⊤, then 6|=
Mbig T.
Hence, Rbiga(v) 6= ∅. Thus taking any (v, v
′) ∈ Rbiga gives us a minimal
R′ = {(v, v′)} such that M ′′ = 〈val(S ),R ∪ R′〉 is a model of T.
Lemma B.3 Let T be modular, and Φ be a law. Then T |=
PDL
Φ if and only
if every M ′ = 〈val(S ),R′〉 such that |=
〈W,R〉
T and R ⊆ R′ is a model of Φ.
Proof:
(⇒): Straightforward, as T |=
PDL
Φ implies |=
M
Φ for every M such that |=
M
T,
in particular for those that are extensions of some model of T.
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(⇐): Suppose T 6|=
PDL
Φ. Then there is M = 〈W,R〉 such that |=
M
T and
6|=
M
Φ. As T is modular, the big model Mbig = 〈Wbig,Rbig〉 of T is a model
of T. Then by Lemma B.2 there is a minimal extension R′ of R w.r.t. Rbig
such that M ′ = 〈val(S ),R ∪ R′〉 is a model of T. Because 6|=
M
Φ, there is
w ∈W such that 6|=
M
w
Φ. If Φ is some propositional ϕ ∈ Fml or an effect law,
any extension M ′ of M is such that 6|=
M ′
w
Φ. If Φ is of the form ϕ → 〈a〉⊤,
then |=
M
w
ϕ and Ra(w) = ∅. As any extension of M is such that (u, v) ∈ R
′
if and only if u ∈ val(S ) \W, only worlds other than those in W get a new
leaving arrow. Thus (R ∪ R′)a(w) = ∅, and then 6|=
M ′
w
Φ.
Lemma B.4 Let T be modular, Φ a law, and T ′ ∈ T−Φ . If M
′ = 〈val(S ′),R′〉
is a model of T ′, then there is M = {M : M = 〈val(S ),R〉 and |=
M
T} such
that M ′ ∈ M′ for some M′ ∈M−Φ .
Proof: Let M ′ = 〈val(S ′),R′〉 be such that |=
M ′
T ′. If |=
M ′
T, the result
follows. Let’s suppose then 6|=
M ′
T. We analyze each case.
Let Φ be of the form ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤, for some ϕ ∈ Fml. LetM = {M : M =
〈val(S ),R〉}. As T is modular, by Lemmas B.2 and B.3, M is non-empty
and contains only models of T.
Suppose M ′ is not a minimal model of T ′, i.e., there is M ′′ such that
M ′′ M M
′ for some M ∈ M. Then M ′ and M ′′ differ only in the
executability of a in a given ϕ-world, viz. a π ∧ ϕA-context, for some π ∈
IP(S ∧ ϕ) and ϕA =
∧
pi∈atm(pi)
pi∈A
pi ∧
∧
pi∈atm(pi)
pi /∈A
¬pi such that A ⊆ atm(π).
Because 6|=
M ′
(π ∧ϕA)→ 〈a〉⊤, we must have |=
M ′′
(π ∧ϕA)→ 〈a〉⊤ and then
|=
M ′′
T. Hence M ′ is minimal w.r.t. M .
When contracting executability laws, S ′ = S . Hence taking the right R
and a minimal Rϕa such that M = 〈val(S ),R〉 and R
′ = R \ Rϕa , for some
Rϕa ⊆ {(w,w
′) :|=
M
w
ϕ and (w,w′) ∈ Ra}, we construct M
′ = M∪ {M ′} ∈
M−
ϕ→〈a〉⊤.
Let Φ be of the form ϕ → [a]ψ, for ϕ,ψ ∈ Fml. Let M = {M : M =
〈val(S ),R〉}. As T is modular, by Lemmas B.2 and B.3, M is non-empty
and contains only models of T.
We claim that M ′ has only one arrow linking a ϕ-world, viz. a context
ϕi ∧ π ∧ ϕA for some π ∈ IP(S ∧ ϕ) and ϕA =
∧
pi∈atm(pi)
pi∈A
pi ∧
∧
pi∈atm(pi)
pi /∈A
¬pi,
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such that A ⊆ atm(π), to a π′-world, where π′ ∈ IP(S ∧ ¬ψ). The proof is
as follows: given ℓ ∈ Lit such that ℓ holds in this ϕi ∧ π ∧ ϕA-world
• if (π ∧ϕA ∧ ℓ)→ [a](ψ ∨ ℓ) /∈ T
′, then ℓ /∈ π′ and T |=
PDL
(π ∧ϕA∧ ℓ)→
[a]¬ℓ. Then this world has only ¬ℓ-successors.
• if (π ∧ϕA ∧ ℓ)→ [a](ψ ∨ ℓ) ∈ T
′, then every π′-successor is an ℓ-world.
By successively applying this reasoning to each ℓ that holds in this ϕi∧π∧ϕA-
world, we will end up with only one π′-successor.
Suppose now that M ′ is not a minimal model of T ′, i.e., there is M ′′
such that |=
M ′′
T ′ and M ′′ M M
′ for some M ∈ M. Then M ′ and M ′′
differ only in the effects on that ϕi∧π∧ϕA-world: M
′′ has no arrow linking
it to a π′-world. Then we have |=
M ′′
(ϕi ∧ π ∧ ϕA) → [a]ψi, and then |=
M ′′
T.
Hence M ′ is a minimal model of T ′ w.r.t. M .
When contracting effect laws, S ′ = S . Thus taking the right R and
a minimal Rϕ,ψa such that M = 〈val(S ),R〉 and R
′ = R ∪ Rϕ,ψa , for some
Rϕ,ψa ⊆ {(w,w
′) :|=
M
w
ϕ and w′ ∈ RelTarget(w,ϕ→ [a]ψ,M ,M)}, we con-
struct M′ =M∪ {M ′} ∈ M−
ϕ→[a]ψ.
Let now Φ be ϕ for some ϕ ∈ Fml. Since T is modular, by Lemmas B.2
and B.3 there is M = 〈val(S ),R〉 such that |=
M
T. We know val(S ) ⊆
val(S−). Because ¬ϕ → [a]⊥ ∈ T ′, R′a(v) = ∅ for every ¬ϕ-world v added
in M ′. Hence, because ⊖ is minimal, taking M = {M } gives us the result.
Proof of Theorem 5.3
From the hypothesis that T is modular and Lemma B.1, it follows that
T ′ is modular, too. Then M ′ = 〈val(S ′),R〉 is a model of T ′, by Lemma B.3.
From this and Lemma B.4 the result follows.
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